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Who does and doesn’t pay taxes?

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  • Advani, Arun

    (University of Warwick, CAGE, and IFS)

Abstract

We use administrative tax data from audits of self-assessment tax returns to understand what types individuals are most likely to be non-compliant. Non-compliance is common, with one-third of taxpayers underpaying by some amount, although half of aggregate under-reporting is done by just 2% of taxpayers. Third party reporting reduces non-compliance, while working in a cash-prevalent industry increases it. However, compliance also varies significantly with individual characteristics: non-compliance is higher for men and younger people. These results matter for measuring inequality, for understanding taxpayer behaviour, and for targeting audit resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Advani, Arun, 2020. "Who does and doesn’t pay taxes?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1321, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1321
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    Cited by:

    1. Arun Advani, 2022. "Who does and doesn't pay taxes?," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(1), pages 5-22, March.
    2. Roantree, Barra & Kakoulidou, Theoni, 2021. "Options for raising tax revenue in Ireland," Papers BP2022/1, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    3. Advani, Arun & Summers, Andy & Tarrant, Hannah, 2020. "Measuring UK top incomes," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 490, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).

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