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Market Microstructure and Incentives to Invest

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  • Daniel F. Spulber

Abstract

Market organization significantly affects total output and incentives for firms to invest. I compare three types of market organization. In a market with search and random matching, total output is excessive and there are incentives for inefficient underinvestment. In a market with a monopoly dealer, total output is insufficient and underinvestment also occurs. Competition between the search market and the dealer market improves incentives to invest, and competition between dealers yields efficient total output and investment. This suggests that additional entry of wholesalers and other interbusiness dealers should stimulate aggregate business investment.

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  • Daniel F. Spulber, 2002. "Market Microstructure and Incentives to Invest," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 352-381, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:2:p:352-381
    DOI: 10.1086/338749
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2016. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(329), pages 172-200, 01.
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    Cited by:

    1. Federico Etro & Elena Stepanova, 2024. "A Century of Art Dealing in New York," Working Papers - Economics wp2024_21.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    2. Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2016. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(329), pages 172-200, January.
    3. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2007. "Buyer power and supplier incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 647-667, April.
    4. Belleflamme, Paul & Peitz, Martin, 2010. "Platform competition and seller investment incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 1059-1076, November.
    5. Heidrun C. Hoppe & Emre Ozdenoren, 2002. "Intermediation in Innovation," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-11, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    6. Karla Atkins & Achla Marathe & Chris Barrett, 2007. "A computational approach to modeling commodity markets," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 30(2), pages 125-142, September.
    7. Tara Mitchell, 2014. "Is Knowledge Power? Competition and Information in Agricultural Markets," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp456, IIIS.
    8. Daniel F. Spulber, 2019. "The economics of markets and platforms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 159-172, January.
    9. BELLEFLAMME, Paul & PEITZ, Martin, 2006. "Intermediation and investment incentives," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006094, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    10. Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik, 2011. "Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 887-924, September.
    11. Etro, Federico, 2016. "Research in economics and industrial organization," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 511-517.
    12. Nadia Burani, 2008. "Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(2), pages 75-117, June.
    13. Antonio Nicita & Massimiliano Vatiero, 2014. "Dixit versus Williamson: the ‘fundamental transformation’ reconsidered," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 439-453, June.
    14. Spulber, Daniel F., 2012. "Tacit knowledge with innovative entrepreneurship," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 641-653.

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