On-the-Job Specific Training and Efficient Screening
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DOI: 10.1086/209973
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Bhaskar, V & Holden, Steinar, 2002.
"Wage Differentiation via Subsidised General Training,"
Economics Discussion Papers
8851, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Bhaskar, V. & Holden, Steinar, 2003. "Wage Differentiation via Subsidised General Training," Memorandum 35/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Steinar Holden & V. Bhaskar, 2003. "Wage Differentiation via Subsidised General Training," CESifo Working Paper Series 848, CESifo.
- Pinoli, Sara, 2008. "Screening ex-ante or screening on-the-job? The impact of the employment contract," MPRA Paper 11429, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mehmet Bac & Serife Genc, 2009. "The French first employment contract: efficient screening device or Kleenex contract?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(1), pages 77-88, September.
- Chandler, Gaylen N. & McKelvie, Alexander & Davidsson, Per, 2009. "Asset specificity and behavioral uncertainty as moderators of the sales growth -- Employment growth relationship in emerging ventures," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 373-387, July.
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