Signaling and strategically delayed promotion
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Cited by:
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- Waldman, Michael, 2016. "The dual avenues of labor market signaling," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 120-134.
- Kato, Takao & Ogawa, Hiromasa & Owan, Hideo, 2016. "Working Hours, Promotion and the Gender Gap in the Workplace," IZA Discussion Papers 10454, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Junichiro Ishida, 2012.
"Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments,"
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(3), pages 627-655.
- Junichiro Ishida, 2006. "Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments," OSIPP Discussion Paper 06E001, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
- Junichiro Ishida, 2012. "Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments," ISER Discussion Paper 0838, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Kazuaki Okamura, 2011. "The Signalling Role of Promotion in Japan," Discussion Papers 1112, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
- Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012.
"The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence,"
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
- DeVaro, Jed & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence," MPRA Paper 1550, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Timothy J. Perri, 2005. "Raiding and Signaling in the Academic Labor Market," Working Papers 05-21, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
- Junichiro Ishida, 2004. "Education as advertisement," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(8), pages 1-8.
- Junichiro Ishida, 2012. "Promotion without Commitment: Signaling, Time Inconsistency and Decentralization of the Firm," ISER Discussion Paper 0843, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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