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Employment Probation as a Sorting Mechanism

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  • Eng Seng Loh

Abstract

Using data from the 1982 National Center for Research in Vocational Education employer survey, the author finds evidence strongly supporting the hypothesis that employment probation induces self-selection by workers. Those who accepted jobs with probationary employment tended to be more efficient workers and less likely to quit than those who took jobs without probation. The author hypothesizes that workers who fear they will not last through the probationary period, either because they are not sure their performance will be adequate or they think they may quit, will not apply for jobs with probation, whereas those who are more confident that their work will be acceptable and that they will not quit will apply for such jobs in order to obtain the higher wages that commonly attach to jobs with probation.

Suggested Citation

  • Eng Seng Loh, 1994. "Employment Probation as a Sorting Mechanism," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 47(3), pages 471-486, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:47:y:1994:i:3:p:471-486
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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Stolorz, 2005. "A Test of the Signalling Hypothesis - Evidence from Natural Experiment," Labor and Demography 0512008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Alison L. Booth & Marco Francesconi & Jeff Frank, 2002. "Temporary Jobs: Stepping Stones Or Dead Ends?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages 189-213, June.
    3. Pauline Givord & Lionel Wilner, 2015. "When Does the Stepping‐Stone Work? Fixed‐Term Contracts Versus Temporary Agency Work in Changing Economic Conditions," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(5), pages 787-805, August.
    4. Francesconi, Marco & L. Booth, Alison & Frank, Jeff, 2000. "Temporary jobs: who gets them, what are they worth, and do they lead anywhere?," ISER Working Paper Series 2000-13, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    5. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolás Porteiro, 2011. "Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 872.11, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Sauermann, Jan, 2006. "Who Invests in Training if Contracts are Temporary? - Empirical Evidence for Germany Using Selection Correction," IWH Discussion Papers 14/2006, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    7. Ferreira Sequeda, M.T. & de Grip, A. & van der Velden, R.K.W., 2015. "Does on-the-job informal learning in OECD countries differ by contract duration," Research Memorandum 021, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    8. Giulio Bosio, 2014. "The Implications of Temporary Jobs on the Distribution of Wages in Italy: An Unconditional IVQTE Approach," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 28(1), pages 64-86, March.
    9. Macho-Stadler, Inés & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2014. "Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 145-164.
    10. Wallette, Mårten, 2005. "Temporary Jobs and On-the-Job Training in Sweden - A Negative Nexus?," Working Papers 2005:13, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    11. Marta Silva & Luis Filipe Martins & Helena Lopes, 2015. "Asymmetric labour market reforms and wage growth with fixed-term contracts: does learning about match quality matter?," Working Papers Series 2 15-04, ISCTE-IUL, Business Research Unit (BRU-IUL).
    12. Bac, Mehmet, 2000. "On-the-Job Specific Training and Efficient Screening," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(4), pages 681-701, October.
    13. Ferreira, Maria & de Grip, Andries & van der Velden, Rolf, 2018. "Does informal learning at work differ between temporary and permanent workers? Evidence from 20 OECD countries," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 18-40.
    14. Francesco Pastore & Luca Giuliani, 2015. "The determinants of youth unemployment. A panel data analysis," Discussion Papers 2_2015, CRISEI, University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
    15. Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina & Serrano-Padial, Ricardo, 2007. "Wage Growth Implications of Fixed-Term Employment: An Analysis by Contract Duration and Job Mobility," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 829-847, October.
    16. Sicilian, Paul, 1995. "Employer search and worker-firm match quality," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(35), pages 515-532.
    17. Pauline GIVORD & Lionel WILNER, 2009. "Fixed-Term Contracts, Incentives and Effort," Working Papers 2009-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    18. Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo & Andreas Wagener, 2017. "The Optimal Duration of Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 6808, CESifo.
    19. Riphahn, Regina T. & Thalmaier, Anja, 1999. "Behavioral Effects of Probation Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism," IZA Discussion Papers 67, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Sarah Brown & John G. Sessions, 2003. "Earnings, Education, and Fixed‐Term Contracts," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 50(4), pages 492-506, September.

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