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Funding Special Education by Total District Enrollment: Advantages, Disadvantages, and Policy Considerations

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  • Elizabeth Dhuey

    (Center for Industrial Relations and Human Resources, University of Toronto)

  • Stephen Lipscomb

    (Mathematica Policy Research, Cambridge, MA)

Abstract

Several states and the federal government distribute aid for special education programs based primarily on total district enrollment and a fixed aid amount per student, a method called census funding. In this policy brief, we address three questions to help policy makers, educators, and researchers better understand census-funding models and special education finance policies in general. The first question is, what are the key advantages and disadvantages of census-funding models? The second and third questions relate to aspects of policy implementation, in the event a state legislature should choose to adopt the approach. First, we examine what options are available to mitigate concerns about the equity of funding under a census funding model. Second, we examine what other options exist for helping states and districts to contain special education costs while maintaining a high level of quality. © 2013 Association for Education Finance and Policy

Suggested Citation

  • Elizabeth Dhuey & Stephen Lipscomb, 2013. "Funding Special Education by Total District Enrollment: Advantages, Disadvantages, and Policy Considerations," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 8(3), pages 316-331, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:edfpol:v:8:y:2013:i:3:p:316-331
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:mpr:mprres:6968 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Elizabeth Dhuey & Stephen Lipscomb, 2011. "Funding Special Education by Capitation: Evidence from State Finance Reforms," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 6(2), pages 168-201, April.
    3. Cullen, Julie Berry, 2003. "The impact of fiscal incentives on student disability rates," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1557-1589, August.
    4. Lori L. Taylor, 2006. "Comparable Wages, Inflation, and School Finance Equity," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 1(3), pages 349-371, June.
    5. Joseph P. Newhouse, 1996. "Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1236-1263, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bowen Li & Guangqin Li & Ji Luo, 2021. "Latent but not absent: The ‘long tail’ nature of rural special education and its dynamic correction mechanism," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(3), pages 1-36, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    special education funding; school district enrollment; census funding model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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