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Preference Pollution, Reasons, and Other Murky Motivations: on some hidden costs of the market

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  • Lanse Minkler

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  • Lanse Minkler, 2004. "Preference Pollution, Reasons, and Other Murky Motivations: on some hidden costs of the market," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 62(2), pages 263-271.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:rsocec:v:62:y:2004:i:2:p:263-271
    DOI: 10.1080/0034676042000183862
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lanse Minkler, 1999. "The Problem with Utility: Toward a Non-Consequentialist/Utility Theory Synthesis," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(1), pages 4-24.
    2. Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2001. "Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
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