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Neocapture: regulatory competition in an open market world

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  • Manouchehr Mokhtari
  • Doha Abdelhamid

Abstract

This paper shows that inter-regulatory competition can have powerful pro-consumer effects in an open economy world even when the consumers have little political influence. These findings overturn the welfare implications of capture theories that show that regulators do not vigorously pursue public interests. The paper also points to the kinds of markets where the political competition has more or less powerful effects (fixed cost technology case). Since markets have become more integrated over time, there are obvious implications for the evolution of regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Manouchehr Mokhtari & Doha Abdelhamid, 2008. "Neocapture: regulatory competition in an open market world," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 1-24.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:22:y:2008:i:1:p:1-24
    DOI: 10.1080/10168730801886812
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard J. Rosen, 2001. "Do regulators search for the quiet life? the relationship between regulators and the regulated in banking," Working Paper Series WP-01-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
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    3. James Sloss, 1970. "Regulation of Motor Freight Transportation: A Quantitative Evaluation of Policy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 1(2), pages 327-366, Autumn.
    4. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    5. Denzau, Arthur T. & Munger, Michael C., 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 89-106, March.
    6. Richard A. Posner, 1971. "Taxation by Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 22-50, Spring.
    7. Sam Peltzman, 1989. "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1989 Micr), pages 1-59.
    8. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mina Baliamoune-Lutz & Stefan Lutz, 2010. "Pre-emption, Predation, and Minimum Quality Standards," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 111-123.
    2. Rajeev K Goel & Jelena Budak & Edo Rajh, 2013. "Bureaucratic Monopoly and the Nature and Timing of Bribes: Evidence from Croatian Data," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 55(1), pages 43-58, March.

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