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Captured Legislators and Their Twenty Billion Dollar Annual Superannuation Cost Legacy

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  • Sue Taylor

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  • Sue Taylor, 2011. "Captured Legislators and Their Twenty Billion Dollar Annual Superannuation Cost Legacy," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 21(3), pages 266-281, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ausact:v:21:y:2011:i:3:p:266-281
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1835-2561.2011.00142.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    2. Sam Peltzman, 1989. "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1989 Micr), pages 1-59.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gustavo Alberto Ruiz Rojas, 2016. "Retórica y contabilidad: de la crítica retórica a la retórica crítica," Revista Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Militar Nueva Granada, vol. 25(1), pages 243-270, December.

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