IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/12565.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Antitrust and Regulation

In: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?

Author

Listed:
  • Dennis W. Carlton
  • Randal C. Picker

Abstract

Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have operated as competing mechanisms to control competition. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests, but specified prices and rules of mandatory dealing. Antitrust promoted competition without favoring special interests, but couldn't formulate rules for particular industries. The deregulation movement reflected the relative competencies of antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign control of competition to courts and regulatory agencies based on their relative strengths. Antitrust also can act as a constraint on what regulators can do. This paper uses the game-theoretic framework of political bargaining and the historical record of antitrust and regulation to establish and illustrate these points.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, 2014. "Antitrust and Regulation," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 25-61, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:12565
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12565.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel, Timothy P & Kleit, Andrew N, 1995. "Disentangling Regulatory Policy: The Effects of State Regulations on Trucking Rates," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 267-284, November.
    2. Michael H. Belzer, 1995. "Collective Bargaining after Deregulation: Do the Teamsters Still Count?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 48(4), pages 636-655, July.
    3. Feitler, Jane N. & Corsi, Thomas M. & Grimm, Curtis M., 1997. "Measuring firm strategic change in the regulated and deregulated motor carrier industry: An 18 year evaluation," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 159-169, September.
    4. Davis, David E & Wilson, Wesley W, 1999. "Deregulation, Mergers, and Employment in the Railroad Industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-22, January.
    5. Edlin, Aaron S. & Farrell, Joseph, 2002. "The American Airlines Case: A Chance to Clarify Predation Policy," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0wx7c4zf, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    6. Robert S. Pindyck, 2005. "Sunk Costs and Real Options in Antitrust," NBER Working Papers 11430, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1978. "Adjudication as a Private Good," NBER Working Papers 0263, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    9. Morris Fiorina, 1982. "Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or administrative process?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 33-66, January.
    10. Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-977, December.
    11. James Peoples, 1998. "Deregulation and the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 111-130, Summer.
    12. Burton, Mark L, 1993. "Railroad Deregulation, Carrier Behavior, and Shipper Response: A Disaggregated Analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 417-434, December.
    13. Ivaldi, Marc & McCullough, Gerard, 2005. "Welfare Trade-Offs in US Rail Mergers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5000, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Bittlingmayer, George, 1985. "Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 77-118, April.
    15. Moore, Thomas Gale, 1978. "The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 327-343, October.
    16. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    17. Bruce L. Benson & M. L. Greenhut, 1987. "Interest Groups and the Antitrust Paradox," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 6(3), pages 801-817, Winter.
    18. Gilligan, Thomas W & Marshall, William J & Weingast, Barry R, 1989. "Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 35-61, April.
    19. Weiman, David F & Levin, Richard C, 1994. "Preying for Monopoly? The Case of Southern Bell Telephone Company, 1894-1912," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(1), pages 103-126, February.
    20. James Giordano, 1997. "Returns to scale and market concentration among the largest survivors of deregulation in the US trucking industry," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(1), pages 101-110.
    21. repec:reg:rpubli:237 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Sam Peltzman, 1989. "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1989 Micr), pages 1-59.
    23. Rose, Nancy L, 1987. "Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1146-1178, December.
    24. Pirrong, Stephen Craig, 1992. "An Application of Core Theory to the Analysis of Ocean Shipping Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 89-131, April.
    25. Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel & Elisabeth M. Landes, 2004. "The Control of Externalities in Sports Leagues: An Analysis of Restrictions in the National Hockey League," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages 268-288, February.
    26. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
    27. Milton L. Mueller, 1997. "Universal Service," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 53006, September.
    28. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    29. Dennis W. Carlton, 2001. "A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided," NBER Working Papers 8105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nishida, Mitsukuni & Gil, Ricard, 2014. "Regulation, enforcement, and entry: Evidence from the Spanish local TV industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 11-23.
    2. Dennis W. Carlton, 2007. "Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 155-176, Summer.
    3. Howell, Bronwyn, 2008. "The End or the Means? The Pursuit of Competition in Regulated Telecommunications Markets," Working Paper Series 4002, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    4. Fatih Cemil Ozbugday, 2013. "Individual Exemption Applications and Their Assessment: Lessons from the Competition Law Change in the Netherlands during the 1990s," Business and Management Research, Business and Management Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 2(4), pages 148-164, December.
    5. Joan Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez, 2008. "The drivers of antitrust effectiveness," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 185(2), pages 69-88, July.
    6. Morkre, Morris & Spinanger, Dean & Tran, Lien, 2008. "Are unfair import laws unfair to developing countries: evidence from US antidumping actions 1990 - 2004," Kiel Working Papers 1438, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    7. repec:vuw:vuwscr:19104 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Dennis W. Carlton, 2010. "Mergers in Regulated Industries: Electricity," Chapters, in: Abel M. Mateus & Teresa Moreira (ed.), Competition Law and Economics, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Wisuttisak, Pornchai, 2012. "Regulation and competition issues in Thai electricity sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 185-198.
    10. Francesc Trillas Jané, 2016. "Behavioral Regulatory Agencies," Working Papers wpdea1606, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.
    11. repec:vuw:vuwscr:19134 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2011. "A General Framework for Regulation and Liberalization in Network Industries," Chapters, in: Matthias Finger & Rolf W. Künneke (ed.), International Handbook of Network Industries, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Howell, Bronwyn, 2009. "Politics and the Pursuit of Efficiency in New Zealand's Telecommunications Sector 1987-2008," Working Paper Series 19134, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    14. Brouwer, E. & Ozbugday, F.C., 2011. "Competition Law, Antitrust Immunity and Profits : A Dynamic Panel Analysis," Discussion Paper 2011-038, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    15. Howell, Bronwyn, 2008. "From Competition to Regulation: New Zealand Telecommunications Sector Performance 1987-2007," Working Paper Series 19104, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    16. Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, 2008. "Appropriate Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct," EAG Discussions Papers 200802, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    17. Carletti, Elena & Hartmann, Philipp & Ongena, Steven, 2007. "The economic impact of merger control: what is special about banking?," Working Paper Series 786, European Central Bank.
    18. Howell, Bronwyn, 2008. "From Competition to Regulation: New Zealand Telecommunications Sector Performance 1987-2007," Working Paper Series 4003, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    19. Howell, Bronwyn, 2009. "Politics and the Pursuit of Efficiency in New Zealand's Telecommunications Sector 1987-2008," Working Paper Series 4032, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    20. repec:vuw:vuwscr:19103 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    22. Howell, Bronwyn, 2008. "The End or the Means? The Pursuit of Competition in Regulated Telecommunications Markets," Working Paper Series 19103, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ovtchinnikov, Alexei V., 2013. "Merger waves following industry deregulation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 51-76.
    2. James W. Hughes & Michael J. Moore & Edward A. Snyder, 2002. ""Napsterizing" Pharmaceuticals: Access, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare," NBER Working Papers 9229, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Alejandro Castaneda, 2020. "Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico," Tiempo y Economía, Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano, vol. 7(2), pages 90-118, July.
    4. P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
    5. Irja Vormedal & Lars H. Gulbrandsen & Jon Birger Skjærseth, 2020. "Big Oil and Climate Regulation: Business as Usual or a Changing Business?," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 20(4), pages 143-166, Autumn.
    6. Haselmann, Rainer & Sarkar, Arkodipta & Singla, Shikhar & Vig, Vikrant, 2022. "The political economy of financial regulation," LawFin Working Paper Series 45, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin).
    7. Till Bärnighausen & David Bloom, 2009. "Changing Research Perspectives on the Global Health Workforce," PGDA Working Papers 4609, Program on the Global Demography of Aging.
    8. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    9. Michael Hantke-Domas, 2003. "The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 165-194, March.
    10. Sanjay Patnaik, 2019. "A cross-country study of collective political strategy: Greenhouse gas regulations in the European Union," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 50(7), pages 1130-1155, September.
    11. Estache, Antonio & Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2010. "What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Sue Taylor, 2011. "Captured Legislators and Their Twenty Billion Dollar Annual Superannuation Cost Legacy," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 21(3), pages 266-281, September.
    13. Keohane, Nathaniel O. & Revesz, Richard L. & Stavins, Robert N., 1997. "The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," Discussion Papers 10759, Resources for the Future.
    14. Christensen, Hans B. & Liu, Lisa Yao & Maffett, Mark, 2020. "Proactive financial reporting enforcement and shareholder wealth," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2).
    15. Helge Berger & Stephan Danninger, 2007. "The Employment Effects of Labor and Product Market Deregulation and Their Implications for Structural Reform," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 54(3), pages 591-619, July.
    16. James B. Bailey & Diana W. Thomas & Joseph R. Anderson, 2019. "Regressive effects of regulation on wages," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(1), pages 91-103, July.
    17. Contractor, Farok J. & Dangol, Ramesh & Nuruzzaman, N. & Raghunath, S., 2020. "How do country regulations and business environment impact foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows?," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(2).
    18. Fishback, Price V. & Kantor, Shawn Everett, 1998. "The Political Economy of Workers' Compensation Benefit Levels, 1910-1930," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 109-139, April.
    19. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2011. "Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Waters II, William G., 2007. "Evolution of Railroad Economics," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 11-67, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:12565. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.