Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons
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- Harrison, Mark & Markevich, Andrei, 2007. "Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons," Economic Research Papers 269771, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Mark Harrison & Andrei Markevich, 2007. "Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons," Working Papers w0109, New Economic School (NES).
- Mark Harrison & Andrei Markevich, 2007. "Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons," Working Papers w0109, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
References listed on IDEAS
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- Olivier Meier & Aurélie Sannajust, 2021. "The smart contract revolution: a solution for the holdup problem?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 1073-1088, August.
- Dieter Balkenborg & Todd Kaplan & Timothy Miller, 2012.
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The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(4), pages 377-385, October.
- Balkenborg, Dieter & Kaplan, Todd R & Miller, Tim, 2010. "A simple economic teaching experiment on the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 24772, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Olivier Meier & Aurélie Sannajust, 0. "The smart contract revolution: a solution for the holdup problem?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-16.
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More about this item
Keywords
Contracts ; Dictatorship ; Hold-Up Problem ; Soviet Economy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
- P2 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HIS-2007-11-24 (Business, Economic and Financial History)
- NEP-IND-2007-11-24 (Industrial Organization)
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