Uncertainty shocks and policymakers’ behavior: evidence from the subprime crisis era

Purpose - – The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the 2007-2009 uncertainty shocks on policymakers’ behavior. Design/methodology/approach - – Uncertainty shocks in the US credit, financial and production markets are represented by extraordinary events. As in Bloom (2009), these events are associated with significant economic and political shocks (e.g. Lehman Brothers’ collapse). Credit markets uncertainty shocks, which played a crucial role in the aftermath of the house prices collapse in the USA, are first analyzed in a bivariate VAR context, and then, embodied in a simple theoretical framework. Findings - – The empirical evidence suggests that the US credit, financial and production markets have been affected by a relative large number of uncertainty shocks (i.e. rare events). In a Brainard’s (1967) uncertainty scenario, it is shown that a bizarre money-liquidity relationship exacerbates the “policymakers’ cautiousness-aggressiveness trade-off.” In addition, the model suggests that a “double” dose of policy, in presence of a global credit crunch, might be useless. Originality/value - – This paper improves the existing literature in two main directions. First, it provides novel empirical evidence on the unusual dynamics of the US credit market and its effects on the real economic activity during the crisis. Second, in a very simple theoretical framework accounting for parameter uncertainty, it addresses whether a bizarre money-credit relationship affects policymakers’ behavior (i.e. cautiousness vs aggressiveness).