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In quest of the banks set in spatial voting games

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  • Scott Feld
  • Joseph Godfrey
  • Bernard Grofman

Abstract

The Banks set (1(4):295–306, 1985 ) is one of the more important concepts in voting theory since it tells us about the sophisticated outcomes of standard amendment voting procedures commonly in use throughout the English speaking world (and elsewhere as well). While the properties of the Banks set for finite voting games have been extensively studied, little is known about how to find members of this set for majority rule spatial voting games involving possibly infinite agendas. We look at this question for two-dimensional games where voters have Euclidean preferences, and offer a variety of new results that delimit areas of the space that can be shown to lie within the Banks set, such as the Schattschneider set, the tri-median set, and the Banks line set—geometric constructs which we show to be nested within one another. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Scott Feld & Joseph Godfrey & Bernard Grofman, 2013. "In quest of the banks set in spatial voting games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 43-71, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:1:p:43-71
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0676-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Owen, G & Shapley, L S, 1989. "Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(3), pages 339-356.
    2. Miller, Nicholas R & Grofman, Bernard & Feld, Scott L, 1990. "The Structure of the Banks Set," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 66(3), pages 243-251, September.
    3. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 88-105, March.
    4. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
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