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Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems

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  • Eliora Hout
  • Harrie Swart
  • Annemarie Veer

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  • Eliora Hout & Harrie Swart & Annemarie Veer, 2006. "Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 459-475, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:459-475
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0103-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October.
    2. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    3. Roberts, Fred S., 1991. "Characterizations of the plurality function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 101-127, April.
    4. Vincent Merlin & Jörg Naeve, 2000. "Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 191/2000, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2001.
    5. Sertel, Murat R., 1988. "Characterizing approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 207-211, June.
    6. Young, H Peyton, 1974. "A Note on Preference Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(6), pages 1129-1131, November.
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