Informational requirements of social choice rules
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- Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October.
- H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
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- Sato, Shin, 2016. "Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: A characterization of the plurality with a runoff," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 11-19.
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Keywords
Antiplurality rule Minimal informational requirement Plurality rule Social choice rule;Statistics
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