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Characterizing approval voting

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  • Sertel, Murat R.

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  • Sertel, Murat R., 1988. "Characterizing approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 207-211, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:45:y:1988:i:1:p:207-211
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    Cited by:

    1. Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004. "Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 331-347, April.
    2. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
    3. Martínez, Ricardo & Moreno, Bernardo, 2017. "Qualified voting systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 49-54.
    4. Brandl, Florian & Peters, Dominik, 2022. "Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    5. Martin Lackner & Piotr Skowron, 2017. "Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules," Papers 1704.02453, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2019.
    6. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2014. "Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 69-78.
    7. Eliora Hout & Harrie Swart & Annemarie Veer, 2006. "Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 459-475, December.
    8. Norihisa Sato, 2014. "A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 809-825, December.
    9. Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz, 2008. "Weighted approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(1), pages 129-146, July.
    10. François Maniquet & Philippe Mongin, 2015. "Approval voting and Arrow’s impossibility theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 519-532, March.
    11. Duddy, Conal & Piggins, Ashley, 2013. "Collective approval," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 190-194.
    12. Trevor Leach & Robert C. Powers, 2020. "Majority rule on j-rich ballot spaces," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 639-655, April.

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