IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gla/glaewp/2017_04.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A composition-consistency characterization of the plurality rule

Author

Listed:
  • Z. Emel Ozturk

Abstract

We consider a collective choice problem in which the number of alternatives and the number of voters may vary. The two fundamental axioms in such a setting are reinforcement and composition-consistency. The former guarantees that the social choice rule cannot be manipulated by partitioning the electorate into sub-electorates. The latter guarantees that the rule cannot be manipulated by altering the set of alternatives entering an election via a procedure called cloning. Brandl et al. (2016) show that reinforcement and composition-consistency are incompatible. We propose a plausible weakening of composition-consistency called composition-consistency for dominated clones. We show that there is only one social choice rule that satisfies reinforcement, unanimity and composition- consistency for dominated clones. The rule is the well-known plurality rule which selects the alternatives top-ranked by the largest number of voters.

Suggested Citation

  • Z. Emel Ozturk, 2017. "A composition-consistency characterization of the plurality rule," Working Papers 2017_04, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    • Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2017_04
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_515841_en.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sekiguchi, Yohei, 2012. "A characterization of the plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 330-332.
    2. Laslier, Jean-Francois, 1996. "Rank-based choice correspondences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 279-286, September.
    3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-1037, July.
    4. Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October.
    5. Yohei Sekiguchi, 2012. "A Characterization of the Plurality Rule," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-833, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    6. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    7. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
    8. Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2008. "An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(3), pages 575-583, March.
    9. Florian Brandl & Felix Brandt & Hans Georg Seedig, 2016. "Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1839-1880, September.
    10. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jean-François Laslier, 1996. "Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 75-93, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Z. Emel Öztürk, 2020. "Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 801-831, September.
    2. Hiroki Saitoh, 2022. "Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 139-173, July.
    3. Lederer, Patrick, 2024. "Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    4. Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2017. "The greatest unhappiness of the least number," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(3), pages 637-655, December.
    5. Barberà, Salvador & Bossert, Walter, 2023. "Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    6. Kurihara, Takashi, 2018. "Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best–worst rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 19-22.
    7. Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Variable-population voting rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 210-221.
    8. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2014. "Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 69-78.
    9. Federico Fioravanti & Ulle Endriss, 2024. "Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes," Papers 2404.17413, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2025.
    10. Sekiguchi, Yohei, 2012. "A characterization of the plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 330-332.
    11. Jac C. Heckelman, 2021. "Characterizing plurality using the majoritarian condition: a new proof and implications for other scoring rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 335-346, December.
    12. Yohei Sekiguchi, 2012. "A Characterization of the Plurality Rule," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-833, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    13. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2023. "An extension of May's Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting," Papers 2312.14256, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
    14. Salvador Barberà & Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2021. "Daunou’s voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 259-289, February.
    15. Kurihara, Takashi, 2018. "A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 110-111.
    16. Federico Fioravanti & Ulle Endriss, 2024. "Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes," Working Papers 329, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    17. Kelly, Jerry S. & Qi, Shaofang, 2016. "Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 39-41.
    18. Brandl, Florian & Peters, Dominik, 2022. "Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    19. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
    20. Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix & Hofbauer, Johannes, 2019. "Welfare maximization entices participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 308-314.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Plurality rule; cloning-consistency; composition-consistency; reinforcement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2017_04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Business School Research Team (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dpglauk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.