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Characterizing best–worst voting systems in the scoring context

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  • José García-Lapresta
  • A. Marley
  • Miguel Martínez-Panero

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  • José García-Lapresta & A. Marley & Miguel Martínez-Panero, 2010. "Characterizing best–worst voting systems in the scoring context," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(3), pages 487-496, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:34:y:2010:i:3:p:487-496
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0417-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    2. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar, 1982. "Implementability via protective equilibria," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 49-65, June.
    3. Vincent Merlin & Jörg Naeve, 2000. "Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 191/2000, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2001.
    4. Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October.
    5. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
    6. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 831-847, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kurihara, Takashi, 2018. "Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best–worst rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 19-22.
    2. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2021. "Axioms for defeat in democratic elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 475-524, October.
    3. Muhammad Mahajne & Oscar Volij, 2017. "The Socially Acceptable Scoring Rule," Working Papers 1705, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    4. Eyal Baharad & Leif Danziger, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6851, CESifo.
    5. Baharad, Eyal & Danziger, Leif, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?," IZA Discussion Papers 11287, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Muhammad Mahajne & Oscar Volij, 2018. "The socially acceptable scoring rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(2), pages 223-233, August.
    7. Baharad, Eyal & Danziger, Leif, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?," GLO Discussion Paper Series 185, Global Labor Organization (GLO).

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