IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reecde/v25y2021i4d10.1007_s10058-021-00249-4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Matching markets and cultural selection

Author

Listed:
  • Jiabin Wu

    (University of Oregon)

Abstract

We study the implications of two different matching mechanisms: bargaining in match (BIM) and binding agreement in the matching market (BAMM) in the context of cultural selection. Under BIM, matching across cultures is not operated through a well-regulated market, where agents’ payoffs are not determined by the market but through negotiation with their matched partners. Under BAMM, matching across cultures is operated through a formal market in which agents make binding agreements. We show that BIM results in inefficiency through cultural selection and possibly leads to assimilation, while BAMM restores efficiency and ensures cultural heterogeneity. The findings highlight the importance of regulating the matching market for multi-cultural societies.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiabin Wu, 2021. "Matching markets and cultural selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(4), pages 267-288, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:25:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s10058-021-00249-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00249-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10058-021-00249-4
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10058-021-00249-4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Neeraj Kaushal, 2006. "Amnesty Programs and the Labor Market Outcomes of Undocumented Workers," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 41(3).
    2. John M. McNamara & Zoltan Barta & Lutz Fromhage & Alasdair I. Houston, 2008. "The coevolution of choosiness and cooperation," Nature, Nature, vol. 451(7175), pages 189-192, January.
    3. George J. Borjas, 2021. "The Economic Benefits from Immigration," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Foundational Essays in Immigration Economics, chapter 13, pages 411-430, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, 1999. "Undocumented workers in the labor market: An analysis of the earnings of legal and illegal Mexican immigrants in the United States," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 12(1), pages 91-116.
    5. Rochford, Sharon C., 1984. "Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 262-281, December.
    6. Shang-Jin Wei & Xiaobo Zhang, 2011. "The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence from Rising Sex Ratios and Savings Rates in China," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 511-564.
    7. Andri Chassambouli & Giovanni Peri, 2015. "The Labor Market Effects of Reducing the Number of Illegal Immigrants," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 792-821, October.
    8. Hong, Lu & Page, Scott E., 2001. "Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 123-163, March.
    9. Alexandros Rigos & Heinrich H. Nax, 2015. "Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas," Discussion Papers in Economics 15/19, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    10. Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2014. "Leave and let leave: A sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 91-113.
    11. Jonathan Newton, 2017. "The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 583-589, May.
    12. Josh Angrist, 2002. "How Do Sex Ratios Affect Marriage and Labor Markets? Evidence from America's Second Generation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 997-1038.
    13. George J. Borjas, 1994. "The Economics of Immigration," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1667-1717, December.
    14. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
    15. Robert A. Pollak, 2019. "How Bargaining in Marriage Drives Marriage Market Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 297-321.
    16. Alberto Bisin & Thierry Verdier, 2000. ""Beyond the Melting Pot": Cultural Transmission, Marriage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 955-988.
    17. Sherrie A. Kossoudji & Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, 2002. "Coming out of the Shadows: Learning about Legal Status and Wages from the Legalized Population," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(3), pages 598-628, July.
    18. Rivas, Javier, 2013. "Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 148-162.
    19. Bisin, Alberto & Verdier, Thierry, 2001. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 298-319, April.
    20. Wu, Jiabin, 2018. "Entitlement to assort: Democracy, compromise culture and economic stability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 146-148.
    21. Christopher Ellis & Jon C. Thompson & Jiabin Wu, 2020. "Labor market characteristics and cultural choice," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1584-1617, September.
    22. Hector Chade & Jan Eeckhout & Lones Smith, 2017. "Sorting through Search and Matching Models in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(2), pages 493-544, June.
    23. Wu, Jiabin, 2017. "Political institutions and the evolution of character traits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 260-276.
    24. Wu, Jiabin & Zhang, Hanzhe, 2020. "Preference Evolution in Different Marriage Markets," Working Papers 2020-1, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    25. Alberto Bisin & Giorgio Topa & Thierry Verdier, 2004. "Religious Intermarriage and Socialization in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(3), pages 615-664, June.
    26. Giovanni Peri, 2016. "Immigrants, Productivity, and Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(4), pages 3-30, Fall.
    27. Ed Hopkins Jr., 2014. "Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing, and Signaling," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 272-292, November.
    28. Trax, Michaela & Brunow, Stephan & Suedekum, Jens, 2015. "Cultural diversity and plant-level productivity," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 85-96.
    29. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    30. Jiabin Wu, 2016. "Evolving assortativity and social conventions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 936-941.
    31. Aloysius Siow, 1998. "Differential Fecundity, Markets, and Gender Roles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(2), pages 334-354, April.
    32. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2002. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 37-72, February.
    33. James D. Montgomery, 2010. "Intergenerational Cultural Transmission as an Evolutionary Game," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 115-136, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ethan Holdahl & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Institutional Screening and the Sustainability of Conditional Cooperation," Papers 2311.02813, arXiv.org.
    2. Wu, Jiabin, 2023. "Institutions, assortative matching and cultural evolution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    2. Jiabin Wu, 2020. "Labelling, homophily and preference evolution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 1-22, March.
    3. Christopher Ellis & Jon C. Thompson & Jiabin Wu, 2020. "Labor market characteristics and cultural choice," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1584-1617, September.
    4. Claudio Deiana & Ludovica Giua & Roberto Nisticò, "undated". "Legalization and Long-Term Outcomes of Immigrant Workers," Development Working Papers 480, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    5. Miriam Marcén & Marina Morales, 2019. "Live together: does culture matter?," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 671-713, June.
    6. Prummer, Anja & Siedlarek, Jan-Peter, 2014. "Institutions And The Preservation Of Cultural Traits," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 470, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    7. Bisin, Alberto & Tura, Giulia, 2019. "Marriage, Fertility, and Cultural Integration in Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 14179, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Marcus H. Böhme & Sarah Kups, 2017. "The economic effects of labour immigration in developing countries: A literature review," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 335, OECD Publishing.
    9. Emanuele Bracco & Luisanna Onnis, 2022. "Immigration, amnesties, and the shadow economy," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(4), pages 1135-1162, October.
    10. Robert A. Pollak, 2019. "How Bargaining in Marriage Drives Marriage Market Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 297-321.
    11. Alberto Bisin & Thierry Verdier, 2010. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and Socialization," Post-Print halshs-00754788, HAL.
    12. Jiabin Wu, 2019. "Social connections and cultural heterogeneity," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 779-798, April.
    13. Ziwei Wang & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Partner Choice and Morality: Preference Evolution under Stable Matching," Papers 2304.11504, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    14. Philipp Ager & Casper Worm Hansen, 2016. "National Immigration Quotas and Local Economic Growth," Discussion Papers 16-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    15. Alberto Bisin & Giulia Tura, 2019. "Marriage, Fertility, and Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Italy," Working Papers 2019-063, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    16. Wu, Jiabin & Zhang, Hanzhe, 2021. "Preference evolution in different matching markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    17. Weiss, Yoram & Yi, Junjian & Zhang, Junsen, 2013. "Hypergamy, Cross-Boundary Marriages, and Family Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 7293, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    18. Magris, Francesco & Russo, Giuseppe, 2016. "Fiscal Revenues and Commitment in Immigration Amnesties," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 75-90.
    19. Lewis, Ethan & Peri, Giovanni, 2015. "Immigration and the Economy of Cities and Regions," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 625-685, Elsevier.
    20. Ran Abramitzky & Adeline Delavande & Luis Vasconcelos, 2011. "Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 124-157, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:25:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s10058-021-00249-4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.