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Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing, and Signaling

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  • Ed Hopkins Jr.

Abstract

One explanation of altruism is that it arises from "mentalizing", the process of understanding the mental states of others. Another is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good genes. This paper shows that these two arguments are stronger together in that altruists who can mentalize have a greater ad- vantage over non-altruists when they can signal their type, even though these signals are costly, when such signalling allows better matching opportunities. Finally, it shown how mentalizing leads to higher payoffs for both partners in a long-term relationship, modeled as a repeated game with private monitoring.

Suggested Citation

  • Ed Hopkins Jr., 2014. "Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing, and Signaling," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 272-292, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:6:y:2014:i:4:p:272-92
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.272
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kandori, Michihiro, 2002. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-15, January.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jiabin Wu, 2021. "Matching markets and cultural selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(4), pages 267-288, December.
    2. Ethan Holdahl & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Institutional Screening and the Sustainability of Conditional Cooperation," Papers 2311.02813, arXiv.org.
    3. Wang, Ruixin, 2015. "Essays on development economics and public economics," Other publications TiSEM e1779514-5b71-4726-925b-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Jiabin Wu, 2020. "Labelling, homophily and preference evolution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 1-22, March.
    5. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2019. "Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 329-354, August.
    6. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 223-247.
    7. Bulte, Erwin & Wang, Ruixin & Zhang, Xiaobo, 2018. "Forced gifts: The burden of being a friend," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 79-98.
    8. Wang, Ruixin, 2016. "Who Should I Share Risk with? Gifts can tell : Theory and Evidence from Rural China," Other publications TiSEM 95c6dbed-3f49-4d5a-987e-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Ziwei Wang & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Partner Choice and Morality: Preference Evolution under Stable Matching," Papers 2304.11504, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    10. Wu, Jiabin & Zhang, Hanzhe, 2021. "Preference evolution in different matching markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    11. Wang, Ruixin, 2016. "Who Should I Share Risk with? Gifts can tell : Theory and Evidence from Rural China," Discussion Paper 2016-003, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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