A class of solidarity allocation rules for TU-games
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- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2016. "A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games," Post-Print halshs-01413042, HAL.
- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015. "A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games," Working Papers 2015-03, CRESE.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
TU-games; Solidarity; null player; Egalitarian Shapley value; Procedural values;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2016-12-04 (Game Theory)
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