IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v41y2012i3p517-552.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Essential collections for equilibrium concepts

Author

Listed:
  • Julio González-Díaz
  • Federica Briata
  • Ignacio García-Jurado
  • Fioravante Patrone

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Julio González-Díaz & Federica Briata & Ignacio García-Jurado & Fioravante Patrone, 2012. "Essential collections for equilibrium concepts," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 517-552, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:3:p:517-552
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0301-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-011-0301-y
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00182-011-0301-y?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
    2. Osborne Martin J., 1993. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 133-151, January.
    3. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    4. John Kleppe & Ruud Hendrickx & Peter Borm & Ignacio García-Jurado & Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, 2010. "Transfers, contracts and strategic games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 18(2), pages 481-492, December.
    5. Ehud Kalai, 2006. "Structural Robustness of Large Games," Discussion Papers 1431, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    7. Ehud Kalai, 2005. "Partially-Specified Large Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000565, UCLA Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
    2. Melkonian, Tigran A., 1998. "Two essays on reputation effects in economic models," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000012873, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    3. Drew Fudenberg, 2015. "Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(3), pages 771-800, July.
    4. Valeska Groenert, 2013. "Trimmed equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 99-114, February.
    5. Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 349-384, June.
    6. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000850, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2014. "Market power and regulation (scientific background)," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2014-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    8. Dominiak, Adam & Lee, Dongwoo, 2023. "Testing rational hypotheses in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    9. Bajoori, Elnaz & Flesch, János & Vermeulen, Dries, 2016. "Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 78-109.
    10. Alvarez, Fernando & Barlevy, Gadi, 2021. "Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    11. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 567-592, August.
    12. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
    13. Bojan Ristić & Dejan Trifunović, 2014. "Horizontal Mergers And Weak And Strong Competition Commissions," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 59(202), pages 69-106, July – Se.
    14. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2012. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-73.
    15. Anderlini Luca & Felli Leonardo & Postlewaite Andrew, 2011. "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 14-28, February.
    16. Eguia, Jon X. & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca & Nicolò, Antonio, 2018. "Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 465-483.
    17. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2013. "Active courts and menu contracts," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 13, pages 281-307, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Mahmoud Elamin, 2015. "Can Reputation Ensure Efficiency in the Structured Finance Market? Majority Voting: A Quantitative Investigation," Working Papers (Old Series) 1441, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    19. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2009. "The Refined Best-Response Correspondence and Backward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000248, David K. Levine.
    20. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2010. "Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 382-383, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:3:p:517-552. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.