Trimmed equilibrium
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0317-3
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More about this item
Keywords
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; Equilibrium refinements; Nonexistence of equilibrium; C72;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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