IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jecrev/v70y2019i3d10.1111_jere.12238.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Using The Tools of Industrial Organisation to Illuminate The Credit Rating Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Lawrence J. White

    (New York University)

Abstract

Until slightly more than a decade ago, the credit rating industry was largely a little-recognised and little-understood part of the financial system “plumbing”. This obscurity changed with the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath. After a few years of intensive attention, however, the CRAs have retreated back to semi-obscurity and attract little media or political attention. The tools of industrial organisation can help us understand this industry: its structure; its behaviour; and its outcomes; and the public policies that are likely to improve its functioning.

Suggested Citation

  • Lawrence J. White, 2019. "Using The Tools of Industrial Organisation to Illuminate The Credit Rating Industry," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 70(3), pages 367-374, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:70:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1111_jere.12238
    DOI: 10.1111/jere.12238
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1111/jere.12238
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/jere.12238?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lawrence J. White, 2013. "Credit Rating Agencies: An Overview," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 93-122, November.
    2. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lawrence J. White, 2019. "Using the Tools of Industrial Organization to Illuminate the Credit Rating Industry," Working Papers 19-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    2. Lawrence J. White, 2016. "Credit Rating Agencies: An Analysis Through the Lenses of Industrial Organization, Finance and Regulation," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 202-226, May.
    3. Peter Kuhn, 1982. "Malfeasance in Long Term Employment Contracts: A New General Model with an Application to Unionism," NBER Working Papers 1045, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Minzyuk, Larysa, 2010. "The development of non-monetary means of payment," MPRA Paper 28167, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
    5. Gil, Ricard & Marion, Justin, 2009. "The Role of Repeated Interactions, Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational [Sub]Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement Auctions," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt6ds5d1pp, University of California Transportation Center.
    6. Blanco Callejo, M, 2007. "LA VENTA DE LA ILUSIÓN Y “LA BRUJA DE ORO”: EL EMBRUJO DE UN CÍRCULO VIRTUOSOi /," Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa (IEDEE), Academia Europea de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa (AEDEM), vol. 13(3), pages 33-56.
    7. Michelle Haynes & Steve Thompson, 2012. "The Economic Significance of User-Generated Feedback," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 153-166, February.
    8. Glenn Boyle & Graeme Guthrie & Luke Gorton, 2010. "Holding onto Your Horses: Conflicts of Interest in Asset Management," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 689-713.
    9. Grégory Jolivet & Bruno Jullien & Fabien Postel-Vinay, 2014. "Reputation and Pricing on the e-Market: Evidence from a Major French Platform," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03460312, HAL.
    10. de Bragança, Gabriel Godofredo Fiuza & Daglish, Toby, 2017. "Investing in vertical integration: electricity retail market participation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 355-365.
    11. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
    12. Khurshed, Arif & Kostas, Dimitris & Mohamed, Abdulkadir & Saadouni, Brahim, 2018. "Initial public offerings on the UK when-issued market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-14.
    13. Rafael Rob & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2006. "Reputation and turnover," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 341-361, June.
    14. Eric Rasmusen, 2008. "Quality-Ensuring Profits," Working Papers 2008-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    15. Benson Bruce L., 2000. "Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernatoria," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 3-32, March.
    16. González-Díaz, Manuel & Montoro-Sánchez, Ángeles, 2011. "Some lessons from incentive theory: Promoting quality in bus transport," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 299-306, March.
    17. Paul A. Grout & Ian Jewitt & Silvia Sonderegger, 2007. "Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(519), pages 93-113, March.
    18. Grubb, Farley, 2000. "The Statutory Regulation of Colonial Servitude: An Incomplete-Contract Approach," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 42-75, January.
    19. Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2017. "Promises and expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 161-178.
    20. Martin Gaynor, "undated". "What Do We Know About Competition and Quality in Health Care Markets?," GSIA Working Papers 2006-E62, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    G14; L59;

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • L59 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:70:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1111_jere.12238. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.