The Role of Repeated Interactions, Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational [Sub]Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement Auctions
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- Gil, Ricard & Marion, Justin, 2009. "The Role of Repeated Interactions, Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational [Sub]Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement Auctions," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt03c1w4d2, University of California Transportation Center.
- Gil, Ricard & Marion, Justin, 2009. "The Role of Repeated Interactions, Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational [Sub]Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement Auctions," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt66z0w84p, University of California Transportation Center.
- Gil, Ricard & Marion, Justin, 2009. "The Role of Repeated Interactions, Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational [Sub]Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement Auctions," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt7r14d10x, University of California Transportation Center.
- Gil, Ricard & Marion, Justin, 2009. "The Role of Repeated Interactions, Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational [Sub]Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement Auctions," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt2kb8p0cd, University of California Transportation Center.
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- Stéphane Saussier & Carine Staropoli & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2009. "Public Private Agreements, Institutions and Competition : when Economic Theory meets Facts," Post-Print hal-00429712, HAL.
- Stéphane Saussier & Carine Staropoli & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2009. "Public Private Agreements, Institutions and Competition : when Economic Theory meets Facts," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00429712, HAL.
- Rui, Huaichuan & Cuervo-Cazurra, Alvaro & Annique Un, C., 2016. "Learning-by-doing in emerging market multinationals: Integration, trial and error, repetition, and extension," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 686-699.
- Gregory Lewis & Patrick Bajari, 2011.
"Procurement Contracting With Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(3), pages 1173-1211.
- Patrick Bajari & Gregory Lewis, 2009. "Procurement Contracting with Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 14855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jean-Baptiste Traversac & Hervé Lanotte, 2011. "An economic history of the Champagne contracts, lessons for regional development," ERSA conference papers ersa11p1145, European Regional Science Association.
- Jean Beuve & Stéphane Saussier, 2012.
"Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract,"
Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 21(4), pages 811-836, August.
- Jean Beuve & Stéphane Saussier, 2012. "Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract," Post-Print hal-00820706, HAL.
- Jean Beuve & Stéphane Saussier, 2012. "Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00820706, HAL.
- Rocco Macchiavello & Ameet Morjaria, 2015.
"The Value of Relationships: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Rose Exports,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 105(9), pages 2911-2945, September.
- Macchiavello, Rocco & Morjaria, Ameet, 2013. "The Value of Relationships: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Rose Exports," CEPR Discussion Papers 9531, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rocco Macchiavello & Ameet Morjaria, 2015. "The value of relationships: evidence from a supply shock to Kenyan rose exports," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68207, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Macchiavello, Rocco & Morjaria, Ameet, 2013. "The Value of Relationships: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Rose Exports," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1032, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Gregory Lewis & Patrick Bajari, 2014. "Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts, and Risk: Evidence from Procurement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(3), pages 1201-1228.
- Gregory Lewis & Patrick Bajari, 2011. "Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk: Evidence from Procurement," NBER Working Papers 17647, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Luigi Moretti & Paola Valbonesi, 2012. "Subcontracting in Public Procurement: An Empirical Investigation," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0154, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
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