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Solving the Puzzle of Prosociality

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  • Herbert Gintis

Abstract

Homo sapiens is the only species in which we observe extensive cooperation among large numbers of genetically unrelated individuals. Incompatible approaches to explaining cooperation among humans have been offered by sociologists, biologists, and economists. None is wholly successful. Each discipline, moreover, has ignored basic insights of the others. This article explains cooperation by combining central contributions of these disciplines, developing a model of cultural evolution in which we use (a) the sociological concept of the internalization of norms to explain cultural transmission; (b) the biological concepts of vertical and oblique transmission to model the interaction of cultural and biological adaptation; and (c) the economic concepts of rational action and the replicator dynamic to model the interaction between self-interested and altruistic behavior. The article closes with a bioeconomic explanation of the human capacity to internalize norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Herbert Gintis, 2003. "Solving the Puzzle of Prosociality," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(2), pages 155-187, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:155-187
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463103015002001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ottone, Stefania, 2006. "fairness: a survey," POLIS Working Papers 57, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    2. Azar, Ofer H., 2004. "What sustains social norms and how they evolve?: The case of tipping," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 49-64, May.
    3. Rojas, Cristian & Cinner, Joshua, 2020. "Do market and trust contexts spillover into public goods contributions? Evidence from experimental games in Papua New Guinea," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).
    4. Cubitt, Robin P. & Drouvelis, Michalis & Gächter, Simon & Kabalin, Ruslan, 2011. "Moral judgments in social dilemmas: How bad is free riding?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 253-264.
    5. Kuiran Shi & Hujie Ma, 2016. "Evolution Of Trust In A Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reciprocal Altruistic Behavior," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(06n07), pages 1-30, September.
    6. Howard T. Welser & Eric Gleave & Deborah S. Vaughan, 2007. "Cultural Evolution, Disproportionate Prior Exposure and the Problem of Cooperation," Rationality and Society, , vol. 19(2), pages 171-202, May.
    7. Denise Anthony & Sean W. Smith & Timothy Williamson, 2009. "Reputation and Reliability in Collective Goods," Rationality and Society, , vol. 21(3), pages 283-306, August.
    8. Pauline Pedehour & Lionel Richefort, 2022. "Empowerment of Social Norms on Water Consumption," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(3), pages 625-655, July.
    9. Alberto Bisin & Giorgio Topa & Thierry Verdier, 2009. "Cultural transmission, socialization and the population dynamics of multiple‐trait distributions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 139-154, March.
    10. Rubin, Jared, 2014. "Centralized institutions and cascades," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 340-357.
    11. Marianna A. Klochko, 2006. "Time Preference and Learning Versus Selection," Rationality and Society, , vol. 18(3), pages 305-331, August.
    12. Moingeon, Bertrand & Quélin, Bertrand & Dalsace, Frédéric & Lumineau, Fabrice, 2006. "Inter-organizational communities of practice: specificities and stakes," HEC Research Papers Series 857, HEC Paris.
    13. Cubitt, Robin P. & Drouvelis, Michalis & Gächter, Simon & Kabalin, Ruslan, 2011. "Moral judgments in social dilemmas: How bad is free riding?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 253-264.
    14. Polterovich, Victor, 2017. "Positive collaboration: Factors and mechanisms of evolution," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 24-41.
    15. Bergh, Andreas & Engseld, Peter, 2005. "The Problem of Cooperation and Reputation Based Choice," Working Papers 2005:27, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 04 May 2006.
    16. Marosán, György, 2007. "A proszociális értékek evolúciója a játékelméleti kísérletek tükrében [The evolution of pro-social values, in the light of game-theory experiments]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 716-733.
    17. Zhijian Wang & Yanran Zhou & Jaimie W. Lien & Jie Zheng & Bin Xu, 2016. "Extortion Can Outperform Generosity in the Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001297, UCLA Department of Economics.
    18. repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001297 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Fabrizio Panebianco, 2016. "The role of persuasion in cultural evolution dynamics," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(3), pages 233-258, September.
    20. Brooks, Jeremy S., 2010. "The Buddha mushroom: Conservation behavior and the development of institutions in Bhutan," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 779-795, February.
    21. Chih, Yao-Yu, 2016. "Social network structure and government provision crowding-out on voluntary contributions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 83-90.
    22. Jenna Bednar & Scott Page, 2007. "Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 19(1), pages 65-97, February.
    23. István Back & Andreas Flache, 2008. "The Adaptive Rationality of Interpersonal Commitment," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(1), pages 65-83, February.

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