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Endogenous Preferences and Social-Dilemma Institutions

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  • Anders Poulsen
  • Odile Poulsen

Abstract

There is robust experimental evidence that some people have selfish preferences, and others have social, or other-regarding, preferences. This paper seeks to explain why there is such preference heterogeneity. In our approach preferences are endogenous to the economy's institutional setup. We consider institutions of the social-dilemma type. Our main result characterizes the endogenous preferences: There is, under a wide set of institutional setups, a unique endogenous preference distribution, where reciprocal, altruistic, and selfish preferences coexist. These results may contribute to understanding how institutions affect preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Anders Poulsen & Odile Poulsen, 2006. "Endogenous Preferences and Social-Dilemma Institutions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(4), pages 627-660, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200612)162:4_627:epasi_2.0.tx_2-g
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anders Poulsen & Odile Poulsen, 2009. "Altruism and welfare when preferences are endogenous," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-02, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Poulsen, Anders & Poulsen, Odile, 2010. "Prisoner's Dilemma payoffs and the evolution of co-operative preferences," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 158-162, April.
    3. Müller, Stephan, 2014. "The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 219, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    4. John Smith, 2012. "The endogenous nature of the measurement of social preferences," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 11(2), pages 235-256, December.
    5. Giangiacomo Bravo & Lucia Tamburino, 2008. "The Evolution of Trust in Non-Simultaneous Exchange Situations," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(1), pages 85-113, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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