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Operational externalities and counter-terrorism

Author

Listed:
  • Aditya Bhan

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

  • Tarun Kabiraj

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

Abstract

In a structure involving two independent terror outfits operating in a country, we study possible implications for counter-terrorism (CT) strategy in the presence and absence of operational externalities. Inter alia, the analysis suggests a possible explanation for the widespread application of defensive CT measures and the sparing use of offensive CT. But confidence-building measures come to be ineffective against resource-constrained outfits, irrespective of the nature and magnitude of externalities. Offensive measures against resource-abundant outfits, appear to be successful in reducing the total number of terror strikes only when strong negative externalities prevail.

Suggested Citation

  • Aditya Bhan & Tarun Kabiraj, 2019. "Operational externalities and counter-terrorism," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 171-187, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inecre:v:54:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s41775-019-00041-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s41775-019-00041-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Todd Sandler & Kevin Siqueira, 2006. "Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1370-1387, November.
    2. Walter Enders & Paan Jindapon, 2010. "Network Externalities and the Structure of Terror Networks," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(2), pages 262-280, April.
    3. Charles H. Anderton & John R. Carter, 2006. "Applying Intermediate Microeconomics to Terrorism," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(4), pages 442-458, October.
    4. Kevin Siqueira & Todd Sandler, 2008. "Defensive Counterterrorism Measures And Domestic Politics," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(6), pages 405-413.
    5. Siqueira, Kevin & Sandler, Todd, 2007. "Terrorist backlash, terrorism mitigation, and policy delegation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1800-1815, September.
    6. Satya P. Das & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2014. "Deterrence, Preemption, And Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem Of Terrorism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 219-238, January.
    7. Arce, Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2007. "Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(4), pages 573-586, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aditya Bhan & Tarun Kabiraj, 2020. "Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(6), pages 1085-1106, December.
    2. Bhan, Aditya & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2020. "Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity," MPRA Paper 98484, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Terrorist outfit; Operational externalities; Counter-terrorism; Offensive and defensive measures; Confidence-building measures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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