IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/empeco/v46y2014i3p999-1017.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Government popularity and the economy: first evidence from German microdata

Author

Listed:
  • Sören Enkelmann

Abstract

This is one of the first studies to estimate a popularity function at the microlevel. Using German microlevel data for the years 1991, 1992, 1998, and 2008, we show that a positive assessment of the economy significantly improves government popularity, while negative evaluations decrease satisfaction with the government. Voters take the (current and expected) national and personal economic situation into account. We find no evidence for a grievance asymmetry, i.e., voters not only punish the government for a bad economy but also reward them in good times. Finally, we show that popularity functions are only very crude proxies for vote functions, with the latter being mostly driven by party identification. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Sören Enkelmann, 2014. "Government popularity and the economy: first evidence from German microdata," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 999-1017, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:empeco:v:46:y:2014:i:3:p:999-1017
    DOI: 10.1007/s00181-013-0707-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00181-013-0707-4
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00181-013-0707-4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mueller, John E., 1970. "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson1," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 18-34, March.
    2. Irem Batool & Gernot Sieg, 2009. "Bread and the attrition of power: Economic events and German election results," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 151-165, October.
    3. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1994. "The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 213-245, June.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Nicola Fuchs-Schundeln, 2005. "Good bye Lenin (or not?): The effect of Communism on people's preferences," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2076, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    5. Neck, Reinhard & Karbuz, Sohbet, 1997. "Econometric Estimations of Popularity Functions: A Case Study for Austria," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(1), pages 57-88, April.
    6. Stokes, Donald E., 1963. "Spatial Models of Party Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 368-377, June.
    7. Kinder, Donald R. & Kiewiet, D. Roderick, 1981. "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 129-161, April.
    8. Martin Paldam, 2008. "Vote and Popularity Functions," Springer Books, in: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, chapter 29, pages 533-550, Springer.
    9. Meehl, Paul E., 1977. "The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 11-30, March.
    10. Berlemann, Michael & Enkelmann, Sören, 2014. "The economic determinants of U.S. presidential approval: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 41-54.
    11. Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich G. Schneider, 2008. "Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-0-387-75870-1, June.
    12. Alberto Alesina & Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007. "Goodbye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1507-1528, September.
    13. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1997. "The grievance asymmetry revisited: A micro study of economic voting in Denmark,1986-1992," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 81-99, February.
    14. Norpoth, Helmut & Gschwend, Thomas, 2010. "The chancellor model: Forecasting German elections," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 42-53, January.
    15. Charles K. Rowley, 2008. "Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy," Springer Books, in: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, chapter 1, pages 3-29, Springer.
    16. Bloom, Howard S. & Price, H. Douglas, 1975. "Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions: the Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 1240-1254, December.
    17. Davis, Otto A. & Hinich, Melvin J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1970. "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 426-448, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rodrigo Cerda & Natalia Gallardo & Rodrigo Vergara, 2017. "Political approval ratings and economic performance: evidence from Latin America," Estudios Públicos 23, Centro de Estudios Públicos.
    2. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2016. "Voting and Popularity," CESifo Working Paper Series 6182, CESifo.
    3. Antoine Auberger, 2020. "The impact of economic and political factors on popularity for France (1981- 2017)," Working Papers hal-02501677, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Soeren Enkelmann, 2013. "Government Popularity and the Economy First Evidence from German Micro Data," Working Paper Series in Economics 274, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    2. Berlemann, Michael & Enkelmann, Sören, 2014. "The economic determinants of U.S. presidential approval: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 41-54.
    3. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2016. "Voting and Popularity," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    4. Antoine Auberger, 2020. "The impact of economic and political factors on popularity for France (1981- 2017)," Working Papers hal-02501677, HAL.
    5. Reinhard Neck & Friedrich Schneider, 2024. "The popularity function: a spurious regression? The case of Austria," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(1), pages 298-329, February.
    6. Antoine Auberger, 2011. "Popularity Functions for the French President and Prime Minister (1995-2007)," Working Papers halshs-00872313, HAL.
    7. Gavoille, Nicolas, 2018. "Who are the ‘ghost’ MPs? Evidence from the French parliament," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 134-148.
    8. Georgios Efthyvoulou, 2012. "Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 295-327, December.
    9. Benny Geys & Jan Vermeir, 2008. "Taxation and presidential approval: separate effects from tax burden and tax structure turbulence?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 301-317, June.
    10. Enkelmann, Sören & Leibrecht, Markus, 2013. "Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 128-132.
    11. John Maloney & Andrew Pickering, 2015. "Voting and the economic cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 119-133, January.
    12. Franch, Fabio, 2021. "Political preferences nowcasting with factor analysis and internet data: The 2012 and 2016 US presidential elections," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    13. Sedef Sen & Murat Donduran, 2017. "Does stock market performance affect the government satisfaction rating in the UK?," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 999-1009, November.
    14. Andrés Cendales & Jhon James Mora, 2015. "Precarious democracies, political negotiation and selective predation," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 30(2), pages 305-339.
    15. Antoine Auberger, 2015. "The impact of economic and political factors on popularity for France (1981-2014)," Working Papers halshs-01264983, HAL.
    16. Alexis Antoniades & Charles W. Calomiris, 2018. "Mortgage Market Credit Conditions and U.S. Presidential Elections," NBER Working Papers 24459, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Andrés Cendales & Jhon James Mora, 2014. "Precarious Democracies, Political Negotiation and Selective Predation," Documentos de Trabajo 12422, Universidad Católica de Colombia.
    18. Padovano, Fabio & Petrarca, Ilaria, 2014. "Are the responsibility and yardstick competition hypotheses mutually consistent?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 459-477.
    19. Mattauch, Linus & Hepburn, Cameron & Stern, Nicholas, 2018. "Pigou pushes preferences: decarbonisation and endogenous values," INET Oxford Working Papers 2018-16, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
    20. Eibich, Peter & Ziebarth, Nicolas, 2014. "Examining the Structure of Spatial Health Effects in Germany Using Hierarchical Bayes Models," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 49, pages 305-320.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vote function; Popularity function; Microdata ; Germany; D72; H11;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:empeco:v:46:y:2014:i:3:p:999-1017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.