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Precarious democracies, political negotiation and selective predation

Author

Listed:
  • Andrés Cendales

    (Universidad Católica de Colombia)

  • Jhon James Mora

    (Universidad ICESI)

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that a precarious democracy is harmful to the poor rather than benefiting them as long as the governing party, being a highly informal organization, includes a cartel of political patrons and business people. The mayor is unable to govern freely due to controls or vetoes exercised by those collective actors to which he/she belongs. Not having been elected democratically, the objective of these groups is to co-opt the state at the subnational level by violating civil rights and liberties on election days and committing crimes against the public administration during the term of government.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Cendales & Jhon James Mora, 2015. "Precarious democracies, political negotiation and selective predation," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 30(2), pages 305-339.
    • Handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:30:y:2015:i:2:p:305-339
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    File URL: https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/30/30
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cendales, Andrés & Mora, Jhon & Arroyo, Santiago, 2015. "Sobre las democracias locales en el Pacífico colombiano y su incidencia en la política pública de agua potable en el periodo 2008-2011," Revista Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, CIE, issue 83, pages 161-192, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    clientelism; poverty; political negotiation; precarious democracies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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