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Modeling factions for ‘effects based operations’, part II: behavioral game theory

Author

Listed:
  • Barry G. Silverman

    (University of Pennsylvania)

  • Gnana Bharathy

    (University of Pennsylvania)

  • Benjamin Nye

    (University of Pennsylvania)

  • Tony Smith

    (University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

Military, diplomatic, and intelligence analysts are increasingly interested in having a valid system of models that span the social sciences and interoperate so that one can determine the effects that may arise from alternative operations (courses of action) in different lands. Part I of this article concentrated on internal validity of the components of such a synthetic framework—a world diplomacy game as well as the agent architecture for modeling leaders and followers in different conflicts. But how valid are such model collections once they are integrated together and used out-of-sample (see Sect. 1)? Section 2 compares these realistic, descriptive agents to normative rational actor theory and offers equilibria insights for conflict games. Sections 3 and 4 offer two real world cases (Iraq and SE Asia) where the agent models are subjected to validity tests and an effects based operations (EBO, as in Smith, Effects based operations: applying network-centric warfare in peace, crisis, and war, 2002) experiment is then run for each case. We conclude by arguing that substantial effort on game realism, best-of-breed social science models, and agent validation efforts is essential if analytic experiments are to effectively explore conflicts and alternative ways to influence outcomes. Such efforts are likely to improve behavioral game theory as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Barry G. Silverman & Gnana Bharathy & Benjamin Nye & Tony Smith, 2008. "Modeling factions for ‘effects based operations’, part II: behavioral game theory," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 120-155, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:comaot:v:14:y:2008:i:2:d:10.1007_s10588-008-9023-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s10588-008-9023-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Green, Kesten C., 2002. "Forecasting decisions in conflict situations: a comparison of game theory, role-playing, and unaided judgement," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 321-344.
    2. Nicola Giocoli, 2003. "Modeling Rational Agents," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2585.
    3. Axelrod, Robert & Bennett, D. Scott, 1993. "A Landscape Theory of Aggregation," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(2), pages 211-233, April.
    4. Armstrong, J. Scott, 2002. "Assessing game theory, role playing, and unaided judgment," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 345-352.
    5. Kaneko, Mamoru, 1982. "Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 281-290, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Barry G. Silverman & Daniel M. Silverman & Gnana Bharathy & Nathan Weyer & William R. Tam, 2021. "StateSim: lessons learned from 20 years of a country modeling and simulation toolset," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 231-263, September.

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