The Double Edge of Case-Studies: A Frame-Based Definition of Economic Models

Starting on the 1950s, the philosophy of science rearranged its methods. Logic gradually lost space as philosophers’ exclusive tool of analysis, whereas case-studies and historical methods emerged as viable instruments. However, the methodological transposition concealed a double-edged knife. The approximation of philosophy and scientific practice happened at the expense of exponentially widening the list of possible philosophical definitions for scientific concepts, creating numerous incomparable explanations. The present paper thus advocates in favor of the use of more objective tools for defining scientific concepts, looking to reduce incomparability of definitions. From this point of view, framing proposals are presented as suitable mechanisms for reasoned definitions, given that frames’ exemplar-dependency entail the necessity of organized selections of case-studies. In this context, community targeting understood as a limit of time and discipline for the selections of case-studies stood out as an organizational criterion. Considering this criterion, the present paper selected as case-studies, for defining the concept of an economic model, the first two cases where the term ‘model’ was utilized for referring to abstract economic reasoning. The proposed frame presented the following attributes: mathematical structure, adaptability, simplification, neutrality and purpose.