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Forecasting decisions in conflict situations: a comparison of game theory, role-playing, and unaided judgement

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  • Green, Kesten C.

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  • Green, Kesten C., 2002. "Forecasting decisions in conflict situations: a comparison of game theory, role-playing, and unaided judgement," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 321-344.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:intfor:v:18:y:2002:i:3:p:321-344
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    8. Armstrong, J. Scott, 1977. "Social irresponsibility in management," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 185-213, September.
    9. Diekmann, Andreas, 1993. "Cooperation in an Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(1), pages 75-85.
    10. Sonnegard, Joakim, 1996. "Determination of first movers in sequential bargaining games: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 359-386, June.
    11. Suleiman, Ramzi, 1996. "Expectations and fairness in a modified Ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 531-554, November.
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