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On the properties of weighted minimum colouring games

Author

Listed:
  • Herbert Hamers

    (Tilburg University, and TIAS)

  • Nayat Horozoglu

    (London School of Economics and Political Science)

  • Henk Norde

    (Tilburg University)

  • Trine Tornøe Platz

    (University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

A weighted minimum colouring (WMC) game is induced by an undirected graph and a positive weight vector on its vertices. The value of a coalition in a WMC game is determined by the weighted chromatic number of its induced subgraph. A graph G is said to be globally (respectively, locally) WMC totally balanced, submodular, or PMAS-admissible, if for all positive integer weight vectors (respectively, for at least one positive integer weight vector), the corresponding WMC game is totally balanced, submodular or admits a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS). We show that a graph G is globally WMC totally balanced if and only if it is perfect, whereas any graph G is locally WMC totally balanced. Furthermore, G is globally (respectively, locally) WMC submodular if and only if it is complete multipartite (respectively, $$(2K_2,P_4)$$ ( 2 K 2 , P 4 ) -free). Finally, we show that G is globally PMAS-admissible if and only if it is $$(2K_2,P_4)$$ ( 2 K 2 , P 4 ) -free, and we provide a partial characterisation of locally PMAS-admissible graphs.

Suggested Citation

  • Herbert Hamers & Nayat Horozoglu & Henk Norde & Trine Tornøe Platz, 2022. "On the properties of weighted minimum colouring games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 963-983, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:318:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10479-021-04374-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-021-04374-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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