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Drop Out Monotonic Rules for Sequencing Situations

Author

Listed:
  • Fernández, C.
  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Hendrickx, R.L.P.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

This note introduces a new monotonicity property for sequencing situations. A sequencing rule is called drop out monotonic if no player will be worse off whenever one of the players decides to drop out of the queue before processing starts. This intuitively appealing property turns out to be very strong: we show that there is at most one rule satisfying both stability and drop out monotonicity. For the standard model of linear cost functions, the existence of this rule is established. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Fernández, C. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Tijs, S.H., 2002. "Drop Out Monotonic Rules for Sequencing Situations," Discussion Paper 2002-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:f343286b-7f46-4c60-94b3-a7f12c8424fe
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
    2. Curiel, I. & Pederzoli, G. & Tijs, S.H., 1989. "Sequencing games," Other publications TiSEM cd695be5-0f54-4548-a952-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
    4. Curiel, Imma & Pederzoli, Giorgio & Tijs, Stef, 1989. "Sequencing games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 344-351, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & van der Laan, Gerard & Talman, Dolf, 2007. "The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 85-104, April.
    2. Fragnelli, V. & Llorca, N. & Sánchez-Soriano, J. & Tijs, S.H., 2006. "Convex Games with Countable Number of Players and Sequencing Situations," Other publications TiSEM 1140b489-9c79-4920-9dea-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Brânzei, R. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H., 2003. "Type Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Multi-Glove Games," Discussion Paper 2003-34, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. René Brink & Gerard Laan & Valeri Vasil’ev, 2007. "Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(2), pages 349-364, November.
    5. Encarnacion Algaba & Rene van den Brink, 2021. "Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-019/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Rodica Brânzei & Tamás Solymosi & Stef Tijs, 2007. "Type monotonic allocation schemes for a class of market games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 15(1), pages 78-88, July.

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    queueing theory; game theory;

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