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Siła przetargowa gospodarstw rolnych w łańcuchach żywnościowych

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  • Dominika Milczarek-Andrzejewska

Abstract

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie argumentów teoretycznych i wniosków z badań empirycznych dotyczących siły przetargowej gospodarstw rolnych we współczesnych łańcuchach żywnościowych. Inspiracje teoretyczne czerpane są głównie z nowej ekonomii politycznej i nowej ekonomii instytucjonalnej. Sformułowano tezę, że siła przetargowa podmiotów zależy zarówno od posiadanych zasobów (siły ekonomicznej), jak i od możliwości wpływania na sferę polityczną (siły politycznej). Analizowane są następujące czynniki rynkowe wpływające na siłę przetargową gospodarstw rolnych: struktura rynku, wielkość posiadanych zasobów ekonomicznych, wielkość kosztów transakcyjnych i zasięg współpracy. Dodatkowo pokazano czynniki polityczne: rozkład preferencji wyborców w danym społeczeństwie oraz wpływ organizacji rolniczych jako ważnych grup interesu. W artykule podjęta została próba uporządkowania definicji i podejść metodologicznych wykorzystywanych w analizie siły przetargowej. Wskazano obszary dalszych badań, kładąc nacisk na analizy dotyczące siły politycznej podmiotów w łańcuchach żywnościowych i na konieczność powiązania tej siły z siłą ekonomiczną.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominika Milczarek-Andrzejewska, 2012. "Siła przetargowa gospodarstw rolnych w łańcuchach żywnościowych," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1-2, pages 135-153.
    • Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2012:i:1-2:p:135-153
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chlebicka, Aleksandra & Fałkowski, Jan & Łopaciuk-Gonczaryk, Beata, 2014. "Grupy Producentów Rolnych A Kapitał Społeczny – Potencjalne Zależności," Village and Agriculture (Wieś i Rolnictwo), Polish Academy of Sciences (IRWiR PAN), Institute of Rural and Agricultural Development, vol. 3(164).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    siła przetargowa; sektor rolno-spożywczy; ekonomia polityczna; ekonomia instytucjonalna;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

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