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Welfare Benefits and Personal Connections in a Democracy: The Case of Muslims in West Bengal

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  • Saheli Bose
  • Vivekananda Mukherjee

Abstract

We study the association between social connections of Muslim households and their access to welfare benefits distributed by local governments in rural West Bengal. Using household data from selected villages in West Bengal, we find that Muslim households with higher outdegree centrality are associated with 2 percentage points probability of receiving a higher fraction of benefits from the local government than Hindu households with similar networks. This association is positive and significant for the benefits under housing and toilets. However, for the allocation of work under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, Hindu households with larger networks obtain more benefits. The results show that poorer Muslim households with a larger spread of network are associated with receiving more benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Saheli Bose & Vivekananda Mukherjee, 2024. "Welfare Benefits and Personal Connections in a Democracy: The Case of Muslims in West Bengal," Journal of South Asian Development, , vol. 19(2), pages 225-249, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:soudev:v:19:y:2024:i:2:p:225-249
    DOI: 10.1177/09731741231207540
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