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The Political Economy of MGNREGS Spending in Andhra Pradesh

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Listed:
  • Megan Sheahan
  • Yanyan Liu
  • Christopher B. Barrett
  • Sudha Narayanan

Abstract

Are ostensibly demand-driven public programs less susceptible to political clientelism even when private goods are allocated? This is examined using expenditure data at the local level from India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • Megan Sheahan & Yanyan Liu & Christopher B. Barrett & Sudha Narayanan, 2014. "The Political Economy of MGNREGS Spending in Andhra Pradesh," Working Papers id:6021, eSocialSciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:6021
    Note: Institutional Papers
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    Cited by:

    1. Farzana Afridi & Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay & Soham Sahoo, 2016. "Female labor force participation and child education in India: evidence from the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme," IZA Journal of Labor & Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 5(1), pages 1-27, December.
    2. Tandel, Vaidehi & Hiranandani, Komal & Kapoor, Mudit, 2019. "What’s in a definition? A study on the suitability of the current urban definition in India through its employment guarantee programme," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 69-84.
    3. Chau, Nancy H. & Liu, Yanyan & Soundararajan, Vidhya, 2017. "Political activism as a determinant of clientelistic transfers: Evidence from an Indian public works program:," IFPRI discussion papers 1700, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    4. Sheahan, Megan & Liu, Yanyan & Narayanan, Sudha & Barrett, Christopher B., 2015. "Disaggregated labor supply implications of guaranteed employment in India," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 237345, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    India; political economy; clientelism; project allocation; employment guarantee; MGNREGS; Andhra Pradesh; private goods; public programs; expenditure data; private; economic growth; poverty reduction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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