IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/67004.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Mandated Political Representation and Redistribution

Author

Listed:
  • Mitra, Anirban

Abstract

Mandated political representation for minorities involves earmarking certain electoral districts where only minority–group candidates are permitted to contest. Such quotas have been implemented in India for certain social groups and for women, although gender quotas in the legislature are popular in several other countries. This paper builds a political–economy model to analyze the effect of such affirmative action on redistribution in equilibrium. Our model predicts that, in situations where the minority–group is economically disadvantaged and where voters favor candidates from their own group, such a quota actually reduces transfers to poorer groups. Moreover, redistribution in reserved districts leads to a rise in within–(minority) group inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • Mitra, Anirban, 2015. "Mandated Political Representation and Redistribution," MPRA Paper 67004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:67004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67004/1/MPRA_paper_67004.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Myerson, Roger B., 1993. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(4), pages 856-869, December.
    2. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
    3. Fernández, Raquel & Levy, Gilat, 2008. "Diversity and redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 925-943, June.
    4. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Sethi, 2010. "A Remark on Color‐Blind Affirmative Action," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 399-406, June.
    5. Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2008. "The Efficacy of Parochial Politics: Caste, Commitment, and Competence in Indian Local Governments," NBER Working Papers 14335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Austen-Smith, David & Wallerstein, Michael, 2006. "Redistribution and affirmative action," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 1789-1823, November.
    7. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2015. "Does Polarisation of Opinions Lead to Polarisation of Platforms? The Case of Correlation Neglect," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 10(3), pages 321-355, September.
    8. Myerson, Roger B., 2006. "Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 3-23, January.
    9. Banerjee, Abhijit V. & Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and Politician Corruption," Working Paper Series rwp07-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    10. Lori Beaman & Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo & Rohini Pande & Petia Topalova, 2009. "Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(4), pages 1497-1540.
    11. Chin, Aimee & Prakash, Nishith, 2011. "The redistributive effects of political reservation for minorities: Evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 265-277, November.
    12. Lublin, David, 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?”," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(1), pages 183-186, March.
    13. Bertrand, Marianne & Hanna, Rema & Mullainathan, Sendhil, 2010. "Affirmative action in education: Evidence from engineering college admissions in India," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 16-29, February.
    14. John D. Huber, 2012. "Measuring Ethnic Voting: Do Proportional Electoral Laws Politicize Ethnicity?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(4), pages 986-1001, October.
    15. Banerjee, Abhijit & Somanathan, Rohini, 2007. "The political economy of public goods: Some evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 287-314, March.
    16. Rohini Pande, 2003. "Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1132-1151, September.
    17. Ashwini Deshpande, 2000. "Does Caste Still Define Disparity? A Look at Inequality in Kerala, India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 322-325, May.
    18. Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande & Lupin Rahman & Vijayendra Rao, 2004. "The Politics of Public Good Provision: Evidence from Indian Local Governments," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 416-426, 04/05.
    19. Siwan Anderson & Debraj Ray, 2012. "The Age Distribution of Missing Women in India," Working Papers id:4842, eSocialSciences.
    20. Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande & Vijayendra Rao, 2005. "Participatory Democracy in Action: Survey Evidence from South India," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 648-657, 04/05.
    21. Mansbridge, Jane, 2003. "Rethinking Representation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 515-528, November.
    22. Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1409-1443, September.
    23. Siwan Anderson & Debraj Ray, 2010. "Missing Women: Age and Disease," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(4), pages 1262-1300.
    24. Svaleryd, Helena, 2009. "Women's representation and public spending," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 186-198, June.
    25. Baldwin, Kate & Huber, John D., 2010. "Economic versus Cultural Differences: Forms of Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(4), pages 644-662, November.
    26. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    27. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1998. "Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 153-180, May.
    28. Cameron, Charles & Epstein, David & O'Halloran, Sharyn, 1996. "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 794-812, December.
    29. Dunning, Thad & Nilekani, Janhavi, 2013. "Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 107(1), pages 35-56, February.
    30. Levy, Gilat, 2004. "A model of political parties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 250-277, April.
    31. Moene, Karl Ove & Wallerstein, Michael, 2001. "Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(4), pages 859-874, December.
    32. Arulampalam, Wiji & Dasgupta, Sugato & Dhillon, Amrita & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 103-119, January.
    33. Francesca Refsum Jensenius, 2015. "Development from Representation? A Study of Quotas for the Scheduled Castes in India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 196-220, July.
    34. Bardhan Pranab K. & Mookherjee Dilip & Parra Torrado Monica, 2010. "Impact of Political Reservations in West Bengal Local Governments on Anti-Poverty Targeting," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-38, January.
    35. Kotsadam, Andreas & Nerman, Måns, 2012. "The Effects of Gender Quotas in Latin American National Elections," Working Papers in Economics 528, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    36. Sarmistha Pal & Sugata Ghosh, 2012. "Poverty, Elite Heterogeneity, And The Allocation Of Public Spending: Panel Evidence From The Indian States," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 58(1), pages 51-78, March.
    37. Chauchard, Simon, 2014. "Can Descriptive Representation Change Beliefs about a Stigmatized Group? Evidence from Rural India," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 108(2), pages 403-422, May.
    38. John D. Huber & Michael M. Ting, 2013. "Redistribution, Pork, And Elections," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(6), pages 1382-1403, December.
    39. Campbell, Rosie & Childs, Sarah & Lovenduski, Joni, 2010. "Do Women Need Women Representatives?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 171-194, January.
    40. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2010. "Determinants of Redistributive Politics: An Empirical Analysis of Land Reforms in West Bengal, India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1572-1600, September.
    41. Ashworth, Scott & Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan, 2014. "Is Voter Competence Good for Voters?: Information, Rationality, and Democratic Performance," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 108(3), pages 565-587, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pi, Jiancai & Zhang, Pengqing, 2021. "Redistribution and wage inequality," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 510-523.
    2. Anirban Mitra & Shabana Mitra, 2017. "Electoral Uncertainty, Income Inequality and The Middle Class," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(602), pages 1119-1152, June.
    3. Ghosh, Sugata & Mitra, Anirban, 2022. "Ethnic identities, public spending and political regimes," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 256-279.
    4. Elizabeth Kaletski & Nishith Prakash, 2016. "Affirmative action policy in developing countries: Lessons learned and a way forward," WIDER Working Paper Series 052, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. Tandon, Sharad, 2012. "Election Outcomes and Food Security: Evidence from Consumption of Scheduled Castes and Tribes in India," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124414, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    6. Anderson, Siwan & Francois, Patrick, 2023. "Reservations and the politics of fear," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
    7. Elizabeth Kaletski & Nishith Prakash, 2016. "Affirmative action policy in developing countries: Lessons learned and a way forward," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-52, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Girard, Victoire, 2018. "Don’t Touch My Road. Evidence from India on Affirmative Action And Everyday Discrimination," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-13.
    2. Elizabeth Kaletski & Nishith Prakash, 2016. "Affirmative action policy in developing countries: Lessons learned and a way forward," WIDER Working Paper Series 052, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Elizabeth Kaletski & Nishith Prakash, 2016. "Affirmative action policy in developing countries: Lessons learned and a way forward," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-52, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    4. Chitra Jogani, 2022. "Effect of Political Quotas on Attributes of Political Candidates and Provision of Public Goods," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 48(2), pages 267-316, April.
    5. Das, Sabyasachi & Mukhopadhyay, Abhiroop & Saroy, Rajas, 2023. "Does affirmative action in politics hinder performance? Evidence from India," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 370-405.
    6. Sabyasachi Das & Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay & Rajas Saroy, 2018. "Does Affirmative Action in Politics Hinder Performance? Evidence from India," Working Papers 1007, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    7. Munshi, K., 2017. "Caste and the Indian Economy," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1759, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Elizabeth Kaletski & Nishith Prakash, 2017. "Can Elected Minority Representatives Affect Health Worker Visits? Evidence from India," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 67-102, February.
    9. Das, Sabyasachi & Mukhopadhyay, Abhiroop & Saroy, Rajas, 2017. "Efficiency Consequences of Affirmative Action in Politics: Evidence from India," IZA Discussion Papers 11093, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Nafisa Halim & Kathryn Yount & Solveig Cunningham & Rohini Pande, 2016. "Women’s Political Empowerment and Investments in Primary Schooling in India," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 813-851, February.
    11. Kaletski, Elizabeth & Prakash, Nishith, 2016. "Does Political Reservation for Minorities Affect Child Labor? Evidence from India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 50-69.
    12. Mori, Yuko & Kurosaki, Takashi, 2013. "Does Political Reservation Affect Voting Behavior? Empirical Evidence from India," CEI Working Paper Series 2012-09, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    13. Ghosh, Sugata & Mitra, Anirban, 2022. "Ethnic identities, public spending and political regimes," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 256-279.
    14. Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay, 2012. "The political economy of implementing the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-015-12, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    15. Cassan, Guilhem & Vandewalle, Lore, 2021. "Identities and public policies: Unexpected effects of political reservations for women in India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    16. Anirban Mitra & Shabana Mitra, 2017. "Electoral Uncertainty, Income Inequality and The Middle Class," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(602), pages 1119-1152, June.
    17. Klaus Deininger & Songqing Jin & Hari K. Nagarajan & Fang Xia, 2015. "Does Female Reservation Affect Long-Term Political Outcomes? Evidence from Rural India," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(1), pages 32-49, January.
    18. Dilip Mookherjee & Pranab K. Bardhan, 2012. "Political Clientelism and Capture: Theory and Evidence from West Bengal, India," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2012-097, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    19. Chin, Aimee & Prakash, Nishith, 2011. "The redistributive effects of political reservation for minorities: Evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 265-277, November.
    20. Tandon, Sharad, 2012. "Election Outcomes and Food Security: Evidence from Consumption of Scheduled Castes and Tribes in India," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124414, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Affirmative action; income distribution; political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • O20 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:67004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.