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Allocation of village public goods at community level: does political reservation help?

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Listed:
  • Vivekananda Mukherjee

    (Jadavpur University)

  • Saheli Bose

    (Jadavpur University)

  • Malabika Roy

    (Jadavpur University)

Abstract

It has been empirically observed that reserving seats for leaders belonging to disadvantaged social groups at the local level improves targeting of household public goods to households belonging to these groups. However, it is not clear whether a similar result holds for the allocation of village public goods that have limited spillover effects across households in a village, such as repair and maintenance of access roads to households, streetlights, sewer lines, etc. The present paper uses locational data collected from a sample of Indian villages and applies spatial econometrics to test whether political reservations for elected representatives increase allocations to households belonging to the reserved community, especially when they are in the minority. The results show that for certain types of village public goods, political reservations produce favourable allocations for the reserved community when locational clustering of the communities is present.

Suggested Citation

  • Vivekananda Mukherjee & Saheli Bose & Malabika Roy, 2020. "Allocation of village public goods at community level: does political reservation help?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 363-393, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:31:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-020-09309-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-020-09309-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Johan Lundberg, 2006. "Spatial interaction model of spillovers from locally provided public services," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(6), pages 631-644.
    2. Esther Duflo, 2005. "Why Political Reservations?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 668-678, 04/05.
    3. Dilip Mookherjee & Pranab K. Bardhan, 2012. "Political Clientelism and Capture: Theory and Evidence from West Bengal, India," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2012-097, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    4. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    5. Mookherjee, Dilip & Bardhan, Pranab K., 2012. "Political Clientelism and Capture: Theory and Evidence from West Bengal, India," WIDER Working Paper Series 097, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    6. Dunning, Thad & Nilekani, Janhavi, 2013. "Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 107(1), pages 35-56, February.
    7. Bardhan Pranab K. & Mookherjee Dilip & Parra Torrado Monica, 2010. "Impact of Political Reservations in West Bengal Local Governments on Anti-Poverty Targeting," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-38, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dasgupta, Indraneel & Pal, Sarmistha, 2021. "Touch thee not: Group conflict, caste power and untouchability in rural India," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 442-466.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Village public goods; Local government; Political reservation; Locational data;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare

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