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Does Political Activism and Affiliation Affect Allocation of Benefits in the Rural Employment Guarantee Program: Evidence from West Bengal, India

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  • Das, Upasak

Abstract

The paper investigates prevalence of political clientelism in allocation of benefits under the rural employment guarantee program, currently implemented in India. Using survey data collected from some villages of West Bengal, it is found that households, which are politically active and supporters of the local ruling political party, are more likely to receive the benefits in terms of participation, number of days of work and earnings from the program. Qualitative evidence corroborates the findings. The study shows predominance of political favoritism under the program and lays emphasis on reducing rationing and enhancing awareness of the entitlements to curb this practice.

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  • Das, Upasak, 2015. "Does Political Activism and Affiliation Affect Allocation of Benefits in the Rural Employment Guarantee Program: Evidence from West Bengal, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 202-217.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:67:y:2015:i:c:p:202-217
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.10.009
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    3. Das, Upasak & Maiorano, Diego, 2019. "Post-clientelistic initiatives in a patronage democracy: The distributive politics of India’s MGNREGA," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 239-252.
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    6. Marcesse, Thibaud, 2018. "Public Policy Reform and Informal Institutions: The Political Articulation of the Demand for Work in Rural India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 284-296.
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    8. Sudha Narayanan & Nicolas Gerber, 2015. "Social safety nets for food and nutritional security in India," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2015-031, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    9. Deininger,Klaus W. & Nagarajan,Hari Krishnan & Singh,Sudhir K. & Deininger,Klaus W. & Nagarajan,Hari Krishnan & Singh,Sudhir K., 2016. "Short-term effects of India's employment guarantee program on labor markets and agricultural productivity," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7665, The World Bank.
    10. Singh, Sanjeet, 2016. "Evaluation of world’s largest social welfare scheme: An assessment using non-parametric approach," Evaluation and Program Planning, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 16-29.
    11. Hare Krisna Kundo, 2018. "Micro politics of Social Safety Net Programmes: The case of the Food‐For‐Work Programme in Bangladesh," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 36(S2), pages 815-830, September.
    12. Whitler, Kimberly A. & Barta, Thomas, 2024. "The enterprise activism risk model: How good intentions can jeopardize business success," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 330-340.
    13. Chakravarty, Shourish & Mullally, Conner, 2018. "Impact of NREGS on Forest Cover," 2018 Annual Meeting, February 2-6, 2018, Jacksonville, Florida 266696, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    14. Sudha Narayanan Narayanan & Nicolas Gerber, 2016. "Safety Nets for Food and Nutritional Security in India," FOODSECURE Working papers 37, LEI Wageningen UR.
    15. Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Alita Nandi, 2016. "Local institutional structure and clientelistic access to employment: the case of MGNREGS in three states of India," Working papers 269, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    16. Huber, Amelie & Joshi, Deepa, 2015. "Hydropower, Anti-Politics, and the Opening of New Political Spaces in the Eastern Himalayas," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 13-25.
    17. Chau, Nancy H. & Liu, Yanyan & Soundararajan, Vidhya, 2017. "Political activism as a determinant of clientelistic transfers: Evidence from an Indian public works program:," IFPRI discussion papers 1700, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    18. Vidhya Unnikrishnan & Subhasish Dey, 2023. "Political meddling in social assistance programme: Panel data evidence from India," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(6), pages 1346-1364, August.
    19. Sanjiv Kumar & S. Madheswaran & B. P. Vani, 2021. "Response of Poverty Pockets to the Right-based Demand-driven MGNREGA Programme," Review of Development and Change, , vol. 26(1), pages 5-24, June.
    20. Somdeep Chatterjee & Shiv Hastawala & Jai Kamal, 2023. "(En‐)‘lightening’ children: Assessing the impacts of access to electricity on learning achievement levels," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 2489-2517, November.
    21. Deininger, Klaus & Nagarajan, Hari K & Singh, Sudhir K, 2020. "Women's political leadership and economic empowerment: Evidence from public works in India," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 277-291.
    22. Narayanan, Sudha & Das, Upasak & Liu, Yanyan & Barrett, Christopher B., 2017. "The “Discouraged Worker Effect” in Public Works Programs: Evidence from the MGNREGA in India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 31-44.
    23. Fischer, Harry W. & Ali, Syed Shoaib, 2019. "Reshaping the public domain: Decentralization, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), and trajectories of local democracy in rural India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 147-158.
    24. Saheli Bose & Vivekananda Mukherjee, 2024. "Welfare Benefits and Personal Connections in a Democracy: The Case of Muslims in West Bengal," Journal of South Asian Development, , vol. 19(2), pages 225-249, August.
    25. Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Alita Nandi, 2023. "Asymmetric networks, clientelism and their impacts: households' access to workfare employment in rural India," Papers 2304.04236, arXiv.org.

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