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Consequences Of Revolutions

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  • Erich Weede
  • Edward N. Muller

Abstract

This is an attempt to evaluate the consequences of revolutions. In our view, revolutions do not contribute to the promotion of liberty, they merely generate a new ruling class or oligarchy, stronger armed forces and more war-involvement. Whether evaluated by economic growth rates, income inequality, or quality of life, the economic performance of postrevolutionary regimes looks unconvincing. Certainly, it cannot compensate for the extraordinary loss of life resulting from 20th century revolutions. This negative balance sheet of revolutions may be explained by a rational choice approach. If public interests or collective goods for the people determined the course of revolutionary events, then the balance should look much better than it does. If revolutionaries are motivated by lust for power and greed, however, then revolutions are human and social capital wasting exercises on a grand scale.

Suggested Citation

  • Erich Weede & Edward N. Muller, 1997. "Consequences Of Revolutions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(3), pages 327-350, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:9:y:1997:i:3:p:327-350
    DOI: 10.1177/104346397009003004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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