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Games and Preference

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  • GORDON TULLOCK

    (University of Arizona)

Abstract

Game theory has had a considerable impact on the way we talk about problems and on our reasoning. But this has been more or less a philosophical effect. When it comes to formal reasoning, the calculation of a mixed strategy is characteristically either impossible or misleading.

Suggested Citation

  • Gordon Tullock, 1992. "Games and Preference," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 24-32, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:24-32
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463192004001004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Characterizing equilibrium rent-seeking behavior: A reply to Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 85-87, January.
    2. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Piotr Swistak, 1992. "What Games? Why Equilibria? Which Equilibria?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 103-116, January.
    2. James W. Friedman, 1992. "Views on the Relevance of Game Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 41-50, January.
    3. John C. Harsanyi, 1992. "In Defense of Game Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 51-61, January.
    4. Roger B. Myerson, 1992. "On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 62-73, January.
    5. Eric Rasmusen, 1992. "Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 83-94, January.

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