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Indispensable Framework or Just another Ideology?

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  • AARON WILDAVSKY

    (University of California, Berkeley)

Abstract

Is Prisoner's Dilemma a natural framework for understanding human interaction? The author's view is that the rationality of the prisoner's dilemma, like rationality in general, is context dependent; without a supportive cultural context, no strategy makes sense. Different strategies will be rational for prisoners within different cultural contexts. The solution favored by most game players, namely, silence, for instance, would be anathema in a hierarchical culture that seeks to inculcate respect for authority. But silence would make sense for egalitarians who wish to undermine authority as inegalitarian on its face. “Distrust everybody†is a strategy that is supported only by people who adhere to fatalistic cultures. Thus the cultural context through which preferences are formed and reformed is central to who will place which values on diverse strategies. It is not rationality per se, as if one form of rationality was reason itself, but diverse rationalities that vary with the objectives of their adherents that should be the mainstay of game theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Aaron Wildavsky, 1992. "Indispensable Framework or Just another Ideology?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 8-23, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:8-23
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463192004001003
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    Cited by:

    1. Piotr Swistak, 1992. "What Games? Why Equilibria? Which Equilibria?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 103-116, January.
    2. James W. Friedman, 1992. "Views on the Relevance of Game Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 41-50, January.
    3. John C. Harsanyi, 1992. "In Defense of Game Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 51-61, January.
    4. Angelo Antoci & Pier Sacco & Luca Zarri, 2004. "Coexistence of Strategies and Culturally-Specific Common Knowledge: An Evolutionary Analysis," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 165-194, May.
    5. Glenn Stephens, 1994. "The Prisoners' Dilemma," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(4), pages 520-524, October.
    6. Roger B. Myerson, 1992. "On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 62-73, January.
    7. Eric Rasmusen, 1992. "Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 83-94, January.

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