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Kooperation und die Aufteilung des Kooperationsgewinns bei horizontaler Politikverflechtung

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  • Zintl, Reinhard

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  • Zintl, Reinhard, 1991. "Kooperation und die Aufteilung des Kooperationsgewinns bei horizontaler Politikverflechtung," MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:916
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(404), pages 107-114, January.
    2. Tollison, Robert D. & Willett, Thomas D., 1979. "An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 425-449, October.
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    5. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-741, September.
    6. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    7. Guth, Werner & Tietz, Reinhard, 1990. "Ultimatum bargaining behavior : A survey and comparison of experimental results," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 417-449, September.
    8. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1990. "Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1325-1348, December.
    9. Richardson, Alan J., 1989. "Corporatism and intraprofessional hegemony: A study of regulation and internal social order," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 14(5-6), pages 415-431, October.
    10. Benz, Arthur, 1991. "Mehr-Ebenen-Verflechtung: Politische Prozesse in verbundenen Entscheidungsarenen," MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    11. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1990. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Problem of Connectedness," MPIfG Discussion Paper 90/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    12. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
    13. Ryll, Andreas, 1989. "Die Spieltheorie als Instrument der Gesellschaftsforschung," MPIfG Discussion Paper 89/10, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    14. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    15. Crawford, Vincent P, 1990. "Explicit Communication and Bargaining Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 213-219, May.
    16. Elinor Ostrom, 1989. "Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(1), pages 11-50, July.
    17. Roth, Alvin E. & Malouf, Michael W. K. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 1981. "Sociological versus strategic factors in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 153-177, June.
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    1. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1991. "Koordination durch Verhandlungssysteme: Analytische Konzepte und institutionelle Lösungen am Beispiel der Zusammenarbeit zwischen zwei Bundesländern," MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/4, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

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