Hawks, Zealots and Hypocrites, but Not Free Riders: The Logics of Cooperation in Llano Del Beal
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DOI: 10.1177/1043463104044683
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References listed on IDEAS
- Douglas D. Heckathorn, 1989. "Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(1), pages 78-100, July.
- Josep M. Colomer, 1995. "Leadership Games in Collective Action," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(2), pages 225-246, April.
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Keywords
collective action; game theory; leadership; social dilemmas; social norms;All these keywords.
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