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The Impact of Intergovernmental Incentives on Student Disability Rates

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  • Sally Kwak

    (University of Hawaii, Department of Economics, Honolulu, HI, USA, kwaks@hawaii.edu)

Abstract

Measured disability rates among school-age children and the associated spending on special education programs have risen steeply over the past thirty years. Currently, about 15 percent of U.S. school children are classified as "disabled." Many observers note that the special education funding programs established by state and federal governments create an incentive for local school districts to drive up disability rates, potentially accounting for some of the rise in measured disability rates. I use the experiences following a major reform of the special education funding system in California to examine this issue. Between 1996 and 1998, the state converted from a system that awarded funds based on the number of students classified as disabled in a district (with funding rates that varied across districts) to one based on total enrollment. This reform induced changes in the total funding awarded to different districts and also reduced the marginal revenue from classifying an additional student as disabled to zero. Consistent with standard models, I find that the California reform creates both "income" and "substitution" effects on the number of students classified as disabled.

Suggested Citation

  • Sally Kwak, 2010. "The Impact of Intergovernmental Incentives on Student Disability Rates," Public Finance Review, , vol. 38(1), pages 41-73, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:38:y:2010:i:1:p:41-73
    DOI: 10.1177/1091142109358707
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cullen, Julie Berry, 2003. "The impact of fiscal incentives on student disability rates," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1557-1589, August.
    2. Hope Corman & Stephen Chaikind, 1993. "The Effect of Low Birthweight on the Health, Behavior, and School Performance of School-Aged Children," NBER Working Papers 4409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    1. Dhuey, Elizabeth & Lipscomb, Stephen, 2010. "Disabled or young? Relative age and special education diagnoses in schools," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 857-872, October.
    2. Eva Deuchert & Lukas Kauer & Helge Liebert & Carl Wuppermann, 2017. "Disability discrimination in higher education: analyzing the quality of counseling services," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(6), pages 543-553, November.
    3. Rangvid, Beatrice Schindler, 2019. "Returning special education students to regular classrooms: Externalities on peers’ reading scores," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 13-22.
    4. Deuchert, Eva & Kauer, Lukas & Liebert, Helge & Wuppermann, Carl, 2013. "No disabled student left behind? - Evidence from a social field experiment," Economics Working Paper Series 1336, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.

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