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Excludability and the Effects of Free Riders: Right-To-Work Laws and Local Public Sector Unionization

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  • Jeffrey S. Zax

    (University of Colorado-Boulder)

  • Casey Ichniowski

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

Benefits of collective bargaining in the local public sector are always nonrival for covered employees. In states with public sector right-to-work laws, they are also nonexcludable. Among 10,308 county and city departments that were nonunion in 1977, the probability of engaging in collective bargaining as of 1982 was signifi cantly and substantially lower in states with right-to-work laws. Furthermore, the larger the department the greater the reductton in the probability of forming a bargaining union. These results are the first nonexperimental evidence of the effects of free riders on the provision of a public good They support the hypothesis that, without excludability, free riders reduce the levels of public good provision.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey S. Zax & Casey Ichniowski, 1991. "Excludability and the Effects of Free Riders: Right-To-Work Laws and Local Public Sector Unionization," Public Finance Review, , vol. 19(3), pages 293-315, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:19:y:1991:i:3:p:293-315
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219101900302
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Franklin G. Mixon & Rand W. Ressler, 1993. "Union Influence and Right‐to‐Work Law Passage," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 183-192, April.
    2. Behroz Baraghoshi & Cihan Bilginsoy, 2013. "Interstate Variations in Private Sector Union Density in the U.S," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 180-202, June.
    3. William M. Doerner & William G. Doerner, 2011. "Collective Bargaining and Job Benefits in Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2000-2009," Working Papers wp2011_01_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University, revised Oct 2012.

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