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Endogenous bargaining power and the theory of small group collective choice

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  • Z. Spindler

Abstract

Contrary to some criticism (Musgrave and Musgrave, and West) the small group collective choice model may yield a determinate, Pareto optimal solution even with all or none bargaining. Such bargaining as well as the solution are implied by the basic assumptions of the theoretical model. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1976

Suggested Citation

  • Z. Spindler, 1976. "Endogenous bargaining power and the theory of small group collective choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 67-78, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:28:y:1976:i:1:p:67-78
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718458
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Z. A. Spindler, 1974. "Endogenous Bargaining Power in Bilateral Monopoly and Bilateral Exchange," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 7(3), pages 463-474, August.
    2. West, E G, 1973. "The Bilateral Monopoly Theory of Public Goods: A Critique," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(5), pages 1226-1235, Sept.-Oct.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joan Esteban & József Sákovics, 2008. "A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict: The Genesis of Bargaining Power," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 227-252, November.
    2. Yochanan Shachmurove & Uriel Spiegel, 2013. "Are All Technological Improvements Beneficial? Absolutely Not," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    3. Jeffrey S. Zax & Casey Ichniowski, 1991. "Excludability and the Effects of Free Riders: Right-To-Work Laws and Local Public Sector Unionization," Public Finance Review, , vol. 19(3), pages 293-315, July.
    4. Shachmurove, Yochanan & Spiegel, Uriel, 2013. "Sustainable effects of technological progress and trade liberalization," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 956-964.
    5. Joan-Maria Esteban & József Sákovics, 2005. "A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict," Working Papers 255, Barcelona School of Economics.

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