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Ekonomiczne przesłanki lobbingu w świetle teorii public choice

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  • Marcin Kalinowski

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  • Marcin Kalinowski, 2005. "Ekonomiczne przesłanki lobbingu w świetle teorii public choice," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 7-8, pages 29-44.
    • Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2005:i:7-8:p:29-44
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 2001. "Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(3), pages 663-672, September.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    3. van Bastelaer, Thierry, 1998. "The Political Economy of Food Pricing: An Extended Empirical Test of the Interest Group Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 43-60, July.
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    5. Gordon Tullock, 1974. "More On The Welfare Costs Of Transfers," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 378-381, January.
    6. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    7. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    8. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
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